Russian aggression in Ukraine has a significant impact on the Middle East and North African countries. The region is experiencing increased unrest as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Political, military, social security, driven by the economic and energy crisis, are the areas where the impact is most sensitive. 

The wheat crisis and inflation have raised fears of political unrest in some countries. About a third of the world's wheat is exported from Russia and Ukraine, but the Middle East and North Africa are among the regions most affected by the disruption of these exports. They import up to 43% of their wheat from Russia and Ukraine. Libya, Lebanon and Egypt are among the largest importers of wheat in the world. Egypt imports 85% of its wheat needs from Russia and Ukraine, while Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, during 2018-2020, imported 50% more wheat from the two states in conflict. 

Regarding corn exports, from 2018 to 2020, Russia and Ukraine exported an average of $6.5 billion worth of corn annually to the Middle East and North Africa. The crisis in grain prices could roil the region again. This has happened before. High wheat and corn prices contributed to the "Arab Spring," whose conflicts are still raging in Syria, Libya and Yemen. The uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt managed to overthrow the Mubarak regime with the slogan "bread, freedom and social justice". Today, inflation in Egypt is 7.6%, while the galloping increase in the prices of basket products has brought the poverty rate to 30%. 

However, developments are not symmetrical. For some countries, the conflict has brought benefits, adding hundreds of billions of dollars to their finances. According to the IMF, oil-exporting countries in the Middle East will generate an additional $1.3 trillion in oil revenue in the next four years. For the first time since 2014, the Gulf states will have a budget surplus. Referring to projections, economic growth is expected to accelerate significantly. The Saudi economy this year touched the highest growth rate in a decade at 9.9%.

The war has created strategic partnership opportunities for gas producers in the region. Within four years, Qatar will provide half of the gas capacity for Europe, in support of the latter to break away from dependence on Russian gas. The EU has signed gas agreements with Egypt and Israel who aspire to be potential gas producers in the region. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates signed an agreement with France which guarantees the latter's oil needs. New energy agreements are under development, where Morocco and Algeria are expected to be included.

Immersed in contrasts of dependence and benefit, it was clear from the beginning of the conflict that most of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, beyond condemning Russian aggression, would maintain a neutral position. Their reaction to the war in Ukraine has been largely muted, with no enthusiasm for sanctions. The O.K.B vote on the resolution to suspend Russia's membership in the Human Rights Council clearly reinforced this position. Libya was the only country in the Middle East that voted in favor of the resolution, while all countries in the region abstained or did not participate in the session, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq, countries seen as US allies. B.A. According to some analysts, the strengthening of economic and military relations between Russia and the countries of the Middle East and North Africa are the reasons for neutrality towards the war in Ukraine. But this is worth reassessing in the light of wider developments and interests.

The political maneuvers in the region are more like the "diplomacy of children". The presumption of neutrality and tendencies for new alliances are perceived as fluid diplomatic maneuvers, a consequence of mistrust. Powerful regional leaders, harshly criticized by the West, are regaining their regional and international weight. Occurring in "comfortable" positions due to the global crisis, the geopolitical position and the power that gives to being a regional power or a potential energy producer, some of them are urgently imposing a leadership approach in the arena of international relations, as a "playable" factor regional and global. OPEC Plus, led by Saudi Arabia, decided to increase oil production "modestly". Which means a lack of willingness to contribute to the mitigation of the crisis. This attitude in favor of Russia goes against the interests of strategic allies, and not only. Tendencies to promote new geopolitical collaborations in times of crisis, challenging existing ones, can prove fatal due to ignorance of "hidden" interests.

The war offered Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan the position of an indispensable figure not only in the region. He skillfully used Turkey's geopolitical position to obtain concessions from NATO, making it conditional on the acceptance of Finland and Sweden. Erdogan maintains friendly relations with Russia, while opposing the war. The sale of Turkish drones to Ukraine has not damaged Turkey's mediating role between the warring parties.

Following this spirit, the diplomatic adviser to the President of the United Arab Emirates, Anwar Gargash, goes further when he states that the Western dominance of the world order is in its last days and that Abu Dhabi is reassessing its alliances. The "rift" between the allies comes from the mouth of the ambassador of the Emirates to the US, who in April this year admitted that relations with Washington were undergoing a "test of endurance", after the United Arab Emirates joined India and China in abstaining from voting on the resolution of the UN Security Council condemning Russian aggression. 

In relief of the reassessment of relations with the West, it seems that relations with China are growing not only economically. Last month, the United Arab Emirates described US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan as "provocative", stressing their support for the "one China" policy. Saudi Arabia also sees China as a multidimensional alternative. In addition to increasing military cooperation, it is considering selling oil to Beijing in yuan, slapping the dollar in international trade. Not only that, President Xi Jinping is expected to make a historic trip to the kingdom this year.

How much can such trends influence the formulation of foreign policy for the countries of the region? Indeed, in recent years the traditional allies of the US in the Middle East have tried to diversify their relations with other countries, including Russia, but most analyzes consider this political diversification as a way to send a message to the administration of President Joe Biden to understand the price of taking sides in this conflict. But if the war and its consequences continue, then it will be difficult to maintain this position.

On the brink of new alliances or reconsolidation of existing ones?

And while most states in the Middle East and North Africa region have much stronger relations with the United States, Russia is becoming an increasingly important economic and military partner. Relations between Egypt and Russia with the strengthening of economic and military relations, the construction project of a nuclear power plant in the northwest of the country, and the convergence of the policies of the two countries in the region, mainly in Syria and Libya, have increased. So far, they have not damaged Egypt's strategic partnership with the United States and the European Union. The Egyptian government's ability to maneuver between the two sides is likely to diminish if the conflict escalates.

In Libya, the Ukraine crisis, in addition to the humanitarian aspect, has geostrategic and political impacts. In this time of crisis, pro-Hafter groups, with the closure of export points, are using oil as a weapon in their hands, to the benefit of Russia. Wagner's Russian mercenaries, backed by Khalifa Haftar's militia in the east of the country and hundreds of Turkish advisers and thousands of Turkish-backed Syrian mercenaries in western Libya, have split the country in two. Russian-Turkish coordination in Libya was one of the factors that prevented another round of fighting between Libyan factions across the country. This coordination is likely to be short-term, as the political maneuvers of Moscow and Ankara hide their economic and political interests in Libya. The reality of the situation offers Russia strategic influence on NATO's southern flank, the possibility of controlling oil production and extending to the Mediterranean coastline.

Morocco asserted Ukraine's territorial integrity, but is working to strengthen strategic relations, especially with permanent members of the Security Council. Despite the neutral diplomatic language, the conflict with Algeria has made both countries target "opposing" allies. 

Meanwhile, Syria, Russia's closest ally in the region, was the first country to recognize the Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. Assad is clear that his existence depends on the alliance with Russia and Iran, but also on Russian-Iranian relations, which are not stable. The Kremlin is increasingly intervening in the region, protecting the Assad regime and its regional alliances. The conflict between Ankara and Damascus on the Turkish-Syrian border has entered a phase of stagnation. The Russian military presence at the Hmeimi air base in Syria, located near gas projects in the eastern Mediterranean, in direct contact with the countries of the region, including the Arab states of the Gulf, Egypt, Israel and Turkey, has a very strategic character. It allows Russia to exert influence outside the former Soviet republics in an effort to overcome isolation from the international community. However, solidarity protests with Ukraine in areas controlled by the Syrian opposition or pro-Russian ones organized by pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon are by no means representative of trends in the Middle East. For public opinion there, food security and the recruitment of mercenaries in the region are more important issues. Iranian influence dominates in these states.

It is true that the Palestinians naturally identified with the Ukrainians, but they "silently" consider the speed of the international community's response to the Russian aggression as a double standard. US opposition to civil society boycott campaigns in support of Palestinian rights, tax breaks to NGOs that pressure Palestinians to withdraw from efforts to prosecute Israeli war crimes suspects at the International Criminal Court, or approval of a new definition on anti-Semitism that considers criticism of Israeli policies as a form of hate speech, has increased the credentials of Hamas and Islamic Jihad among the people. This means the reduction of Fatah's reputation and greater opportunities for alliances with Russia and Iran of the other two factions. 

Turkey, despite its military support for Ukraine, wary of opening up additional areas for confrontation with Russia, has recently assumed the position of mediator between the parties. Despite the relative success so far, in the short- and medium-term, Russian-Turkish relations face a difficult test in Libya, the Black Sea and Syria. 

Tehran is experiencing a long period of isolation. Isolating Iran is beneficial to Moscow regionally and globally. Putin is clear that signing the nuclear deal ends the embargo on Iranian oil, softens the global financial fallout and brings him closer to the West. For Moscow, a Western-oriented Iran is considered more dangerous than a nuclear-armed Iran. The isolation and dissatisfaction of both countries towards the West can lead to the strengthening of the alliance between them, from the exaggeration of bilateral mistrust. This means increased instability in the Middle East and beyond, with increased Iranian presence and support of local Shiite militias, mainly in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

There were two main reasons for Israel's reluctance to condemn the Russian attack on Ukraine. Avoiding the wrath of Putin, who could limit Israeli military interventions against Iran-backed groups in Syria and Lebanon, as well as concern for the safety and well-being of Russia's 150,000 Jews. In response to increased pressure from the United States, Israel denounced Russian aggression, banned the flights of Russian oligarchs to Israel, but rejected Ukraine's request for weapons. Israel is clear that Russia, in an effort to restore respect in the international order, could oppose US policies and overturn the balance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The hesitant forms in the Israeli reactions indicate the delicate level of maintaining balances. 

What is the attitude of the general opinion in the region?

Public opinion polls show that residents believe the region has been subject to Russian-American competition for many years. According to the "Arab Index" 2019-2020, 58% of them have a negative view of US foreign policy. This figure was 41% when it came to Russia's foreign policy. However, what stands out is that 57% of respondents emphasize that unemployment, inflation, poverty, lack of political stability, are the biggest challenges they face. But a recent study shows that the rains have increased probability in favor of Russia. 

What is hidden behind these numbers? 

60% of the region's population is under 25 years old and uses social networks. Information about the Ukrainian conflict comes mainly from Arabic-speaking channels linked to Russia. Such online platforms regularly fuel anti-Western sentiments. The methods used are shifting the debate from the war in Ukraine, publishing statements about the double standards of the West, writing about colonialism and comparing the current situation with past wars in the Middle East. Western counter-narratives in Arabic are not as influential as Russian ones. So the view that Russia is fighting the West on behalf of everyone who doesn't like the United States has only been reinforced.

At the political level, the crisis has not yet led to geopolitical displacement. Most of the countries in the region, including Israel, are trying to maintain the balance between the United States and Russia in order to maximize their interests. On the current trend, Russian-Iranian machinations may backfire, strengthening old existing alliances.