“Slovakia has been staying the course of a pro-European and pro-transatlantic foreign policy. In the country the Conference on the Future of Europe has been seen as an opportunity to hear the citizens’ concerns but also to make a conscious effort to provide information, to educate citizens about the benefits and the responsibilities that come with the EU membership,” has said the Senior Researcher at GLOBSEC Think-tank, Vladislava Gubalova.

As Ms. Gubalova said in an exclusive interview with Albanian Daily News GLOBSEC is a think tank based in Bratislava for over 16 years, with presence in Brussels, Vienna, and Warsaw committed to enhancing security, prosperity, and sustainability in Europe and throughout the world.

She unveiled that the Slovak foreign policy is somewhat shifting from the traditional V4 cooperation (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), towards a more fluid coalitions within the EU that are issue-driven. “There is more attention given to the Slavkov trilateral (Austria, Czechia, Slovakia) and Central Five (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Austria, Czechia).”

As she dwelt on the special relationship between Chancellor Merkel with CEE countries, Ms. Gubalova noted that there is uncertainty about the future course of the relations of Germany under a new Chancellor and CEE countries.  Asked about the EU enlargement policy, the Senior Researcher said countries like Albania will continue to have hurdles in the future accession process.

Relying on opinion polls she believed that citizens in the CEE want the EU to speak in one voice on foreign policy matters but at the same time prefer for the Union to stay neutral in the US-China confrontation. “While a believer of multilateralism, I wonder what kind of multilateralism we will be seeing in the near future. So, for the EU there are few questions withstanding: can the Union act as one, how should it act, does it have all the tools to act as it wishes?” pointed out the GLOBSEC Think-tank’s Senior Researcher Vladislava Gubalova in the following interview:

 - At the outset thank you very much for this interview with Albanian Daily News and as this is the first time that you are a guest to the newspaper please could you say a few words about the GLOBSEC think-tank in Bratislava and your fields of interest?

- Thank you for the opportunity. GLOBSEC is a think tank based in Bratislava, with presence in Brussels, Vienna, and Warsaw. We are committed to enhancing security, prosperity, and sustainability in Europe and throughout the world. For over 16 years, we have generated innovative ideas and solutions by conducting quality research and political insight, driving policy and putting together leaders and stakeholders from multiple sectors. Our motto is telling “ideas shaping the world.” Within our Policy Institute we feature two research centres and three programs dealing with topics related to the future of Europe and its global role, economy and sustainability, the future of defence and security, democracy and tech and society. These fields of interest are prominently featured in our flagship foras - GLOBSEC Bratislava Forum and Tatra Summit.

- With so many ongoing developments in the EU and the European Continent among which I would sort out the Conference on the Future of Europe, Ms. Gubalova, could you highlight some of the main directions of the foreign policy of Slovakia?

- Slovakia has been staying the course of a pro-European and pro-transatlantic foreign policy. In the country the Conference on the Future of Europe has been seen as an opportunity to hear the citizens’ concerns but also to make a conscious effort to provide information, to educate citizens about the benefits and the responsibilities that come with EU membership. The current government has drawn some red lines, including its unwillingness for the current Treaty to be replaced but on the other hand has expressed more openness in using available articles under the current legal and institutional framework. For example, some potential agreement on the highly contested qualified majority voting mechanism.

The Slovak foreign policy is also somewhat shifting from the traditional Visegrad Four cooperation (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), towards a more fluid coalitions within the EU that are issue-driven. There is more attention given to the Slavkov trilateral (Austria, Czechia, Slovakia) and Central Five (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Austria, Czechia).  She unveiled that the Slovak foreign policy is somewhat shifting from the traditional V4 cooperation (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), towards a more fluid coalitions within the EU that are issue-driven. “There is more attention given to the Slavkov trilateral (Austria, Czechia, Slovakia) and Central Five (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Austria, Czechia).”

Lastly, the call for European strategic autonomy, ever loud after the events in Afghanistan and the signing of AUUKUS, is perceived with a great caution in Slovakia. Similarly as other countries in the region, Slovakia insists on complementarity not substitution nor duplicity between defence and security initiatives coming from the EU and NATO’s work.

- The change of power in Germany, and particularly the end of the Merkel era, is being followed attentively but it is also questioning the future course of the new leadership in Berlin. First, Madame Professor, why is there uncertainty among CEE countries regarding the ‘after Merkel era’ in Germany? Secondly, what is special in the edifice of the German – CEE relationship erected during Merkel’s governance over the last 16 years?

- Throughout her 16 years as Chancellor, Angela Merkel has been a strong supporter of the Central and Eastern European region. She knew their challenges. After all, she grew up in Eastern Germany, studied in Czechoslovakia, and admired the region’s anti-communist movements, like Poland’s Solidarity. While serious differences were occurring between Berlin and some CEE governments, Merkel, understanding the history and complexity of the region, stuck to her “open door” policy. When some CEE governments asserted themselves in populist and even confrontational terms on the EU scene, Merkel’s Berlin opted for not severing ties but rather using its own channels to mediate between the EU and these mischievous governments. With Merkel at the leadership position the CEE region had a listener and a steady supporter. 

Of course, there is also the economic side of the relationship between Berlin and CEE. The CEE countries continue to be dependent on Germany in economic terms. To most, Germany is their primary trade partner, with combined trade with Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, exceeding trade between Germany and China. As EU members, through predominantly export-oriented economies tied to German supply chains, the Central European states were able to strengthen and enjoy prosperity.

With the current deep economic interdependence, there is no fear for an abrupt change in this domain.  The current uncertainty is connected more to the patience and understanding that the region will get from the new German government. Will Berlin expect for the countries to continue and somewhat blindly support its policies and agenda or will it treat the CEE region as a constructive and equal partner? How will it treat disagreement from the CEE states? Will the new Chancellor place CEE relations among the priorities or lacking personal connection will opt for other geographical or thematical priorities?

- The approach of CEE countries towards the EU is not similar and there are still differences among the so-called ‘strongest’ and the ‘weak’ members as well as between the latter. Do you think Chancellor Merkel has been the balance keeper to overcome such situations to keep the ‘house in order’ and could her role cause a risk for any new ‘exit’ as rumors have been in the air about ‘Polishexit?  Some years ago it was spoken of as ‘Grexit’… 

- Yes, what we see is the ever-present topic of East-West divide, on the one hand, and the not surprising lack of homogeneity among the CEE states, on the other hand. Some CEE governments stress on the continued divide between older and newer EU members, while others make the case that the divisions that we see in the EU are not based on geography but rather on issues, ideology, and policy approaches. Admittedly, surveys continue to reveal that most citizens from CEE might be supportive of the EU but still consider the region as treated differently. If you remember around the time of Junker’s proposals on how the EU should move forward, leaders from the CEE region loudly warned against “two-speed Europe.”

With this background in mind, we can partially credit Chancellor Merkel as an active balance-keeper. Using personal rapport, Berlin’s leverages, and the German political culture to lead but in a pack has served well most of the time. However, we cannot oversimplify that her contribution alone has kept the “house in order.” Various mechanisms and the functioning of the EU itself, even when in crisis, has also done its job.

And while heavy words like “exit” have been used by individual politicians or media, and we have seen a precedent with Brexit, I do not foresee in the near future other member states that will pursue this legal tool. Just recently the Polish government squashed at once the short discussion, re-stating that membership in the EU is imperative for the country.

- As a follow up, what can you say about the stance of the Visegrad Four (V4) regarding the transition in Berlin and are all in unison with regard to eventual future shifts in Berlin’s stance in the Union, including the aspect of the relations with the US? For example, the French-American dispute on the question of submarines has been backed by the EU members, including Germany.    

- Indeed, the V4 countries have a strong commitment and attachment to good relations with the US. This comes with the notion of having defence and security guarantees from the US (through the NATO framework). While there was a period of time during the Obama and Trump administrations when the region was not much engaged, except Poland by President Trump, the Biden administration has been active to re-assure the V4 of their strategic importance for the US. In addition, with the usual leaning of the V4 states towards support for Berlin, it is harder for Paris to “win their hearts.”

In the current post-AUUKUS fallout between France and the US the EU leadership has been rather outspoken, linking the development to the need for European strategic autonomy but many member states have been cautious. I would say that Germany as well has been somewhat cautious, both due to the way Berlin operates and due to the peculiar time before the federal elections.

- What do you think of the proliferation of groupings within the EU, of course not as prominent as V4? What motives drive the launchers of such initiatives to set up such ‘narrow’ groups and do they undermine the cohesion of the Union to some extent?   

- There have been groupings or loose coalitions for some time in the EU. Usually with several prominent ones, as you have pointed out. What we see now is the more short-lived, issue-based groupings. There is a fluidity in coalition-building. Member states are looking for allies in the Union that can help them serve their own interests in a narrower base. This is why we see a stronger promotion of the Slavkov trilateral, especially in connection to cooperation during the COVID-19 pandemic. Or, the Central Five, or the Frugal Four+1, etc. What we also see is that CEE member states do not group so much together as starting to explore other non-traditional coalitions. Good examples are the splitting into different camps on the topic of rule of law or in the time of deciding on the posted workers directive.

I don’t think that this new element to groupings in the EU would necessarily erode the cohesion in the Union. Rather it can give an opportunity for CEE member states to earn the trust of the older members by being more closely engaged with them in a more informal way. And, it can possibly provide for moving forward on issues where decisions do not entail unanimity.

- Please, Ms. Gubalova, let me touch upon the region of the Western Balkans where the Berlin Process has the authorship of Chancellor Merkel. Do you think that its performance and even its very existence will be affected by the absence of its initiator, Madame Merkel?

- The Berlin process has been already questioned on its functionality. Fearing that it can morph into some alternative to a full EU membership of the countries from the Western Balkans. On the other hand, we do see a continued commitment by all parties to be part of the process. I do not think that the process will cease to exist with the new German government in place. It is a useful platform for German foreign policy to show leadership through coalition-building and support, without “rocking the boat” within the EU.

-Turning to my country, Albania, I would be interested to know if you have ever visited this Balkan country. In any case what is your impression about it, the Albanian people and particularly its perspective to join the EU as it is expecting to start the accession talks with the Union but is delayed because of a Bulgarian veto against North Macedonia? Do you think that the enlargement process should be under the ‘pressure’ of vetoes like the Bulgarian one?

- I have not had the chance to visit Albania but our organization has been involved and continues to implement projects with Albanian experts, young leaders, civil society and public administration. As a matter of fact we just had an excellent event with honest discussion on the topics we are talking about today in Durres.

The enlargement policy in the EU is one of those unanimity-based policies. As in other policy areas, there is no particular will from member states to forego the veto power. I’m afraid that this will stay in place for some time. This means that unfortunately, hopeful to join the Union countries like Albania will continue to have such hurdles in the future. We know that there are member states that are not particularly buying the idea of further EU enlargement and while they are standing-by today, they might be the ones interfering later.

-To conclude, Ms. Gubalova, given the repercussions of the Covid – 19 plague with huge number of victims and ruined economies besides the social impact on the EU people, do you see a revision of the Union’s approach regarding the world order and multilateralism in a post pandemic era the more so as the Conference on the Future of Europe is in progress until the first half of the next year?

- Well, the question of Europe’s global role in a changing and confrontational international order is in the minds of policy-makers, think tankers, and academia. How to have a more resilient, agile, coherent, and influential EU foreign policy to respond to the challenges? The Conference on the Future of Europe gives an opportunity for citizens to make their statement, while leaders in Brussels and the capitals are weighing their approach towards the re-alignment and clash between US and China. Opinion polls show that citizens in the CEE want the EU to speak in one voice on foreign policy matters but at the same time prefer for the Union to stay neutral in the US-China confrontation. But, we know that the EU will have to carefully choose its stand. While a believer of multilateralism, I wonder what kind of multilateralism we will be seeing in the near future. So, for the EU there are few questions withstanding: can the Union act as one, how should it act, does it have all tools to act as it wishes?