Conflicting dynamics, entrenched enlargement fatigue, the so-called “revised accession negotiation methodology”, and a very small group of member states which can always at the end of the day exercise blocking power are highlighted as some of the key elements characterizing the EU accession process with the Western Balkans by Professor George Pagoulatos, Director General of ELIAMEP in an exclusive interview with Albanian Daily News.

The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) is Greece’s leading European and foreign policy think tank and has been around for over three decades.  Among its areas of expertise include the European Union, foreign and security policy, the Balkan neighborhood, Turkey, migration, the Mediterranean, sustainability. According to the Professor, President Joe Biden is a return to normality of the US seeing in him a responsible moderate leader, vastly experienced, with the greatest foreign policy experience from day one since George H.W. Bush senior, a persuaded Euro-Atlanticist and supporter of a rules-based multilateral order.

In a comment on the expected Conference on the Future of Europe Professor Pagoulatos stressed that it is an important opportunity to open the EU agenda to national and pan-European arenas, to listen to the citizens, and deliberate on the future of Europe. “That said, my own expectations are not very high. The agenda has not been clearly defined, and it is not likely that it will include reforms that would require a treaty revision – which is practically out of the question.”

Speaking of the relations between Albania and Greece the Professor said they are good and steadily improving. “The mutual gains of cooperation are obvious, and Albania’s EU orientation creates a converging strategic horizon. So I am optimistic overall,” said Professor George Pagoulatos, Director General of ELIAMEP, in the following interview: 

Albanian Daily News: At the outset thank you, Mr. Director, for sharing with us some of your opinions. I would appreciate it if you could first summarize for us ELIAMEP's prestigious 'CV'.

Professor George Pagoulatos: Thank you for inviting me for this interview. The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) is Greece’s leading European and foreign policy think tank and has been around for over three decades. We are an independent, non-governmental, non-party political think tank; we also conduct applied academic research in the humanities and social sciences, in our wide and expanding areas of interest. In that capacity we implement a wide range of research projects, also responding to competitive research calls of the European Commission, drawing on our very wide international network of institutional partners. The recent Global Think Tank guide, by the University of Pennsylvania, ranks ELIAMEP as No.1 think tank in Greece and among the top-50 think tanks in the world on the “best think tank network” criterion. Among our other areas of expertise (which include the European Union, foreign and security policy, Turkey, migration, the Mediterranean, sustainability) we have established as you know a strong footprint in our Balkan neighborhood; our Southeastern European program, led by Prof. Ioannis Armakolas, has been very active especially in Albania and North Macedonia, and a consistent supporter of the region’s EU and Euro-Atlantic orientation.

- We recently left behind a remarkable year in which we experienced the worst global pandemic in a century, with unparalleled, multidimensional repercussions that have spilled over into 2021. In your opinion, what does the world expect for this year, given we are in its second month and the pandemic has shown no restraint? As a follow up, Mr. Professor, how has the EU handled the crisis? On top of that, what can you say about “vaccine diplomacy”?

-What the world expects is for the vaccination programs to proceed, to accelerate and expand if possible. The term “herd immunity” is apt here, not a very flattering terminology for the human species, but quite necessary to reach that threshold at the soonest possible, probably sometime around summer, maybe a little before or a little after that. Still, the developing world is lagging behind in vaccination, we should not forget that. Now on how the EU has handled the crisis, I would say: caught by surprise in the very first weeks, not being quick in deploying effective support to Italy, which as you recall was the first to be hit brutally by the pandemic. But then getting its act together, coming up with the necessary solidarity and coordination, in a policy area where formal competence and control are mainly national; then in spring and summer adopting the remarkable Recovery package, the Next Generation EU, a fiscal stimulus of historical significance for the EU. The European Commission negotiated on behalf of all member states, which was very good, especially from the standpoint of medium and smaller EU economies which without this European unity would have lacked in bargaining power. Yes, there have been errors and delays and some failures, the most important of which is the insufficient number of vaccines for the EU countries, as a result of which the vaccination program is lagging behind compared to countries like Israel or the UK. However, the EU is moving fast trying to make up for the delays. So overall, the EU deserves a positive mark, despite the setbacks. And vaccine diplomacy has progressed, seeking to reign in on vaccine nationalism.

- 2021 started with the UK outside the Union. How do you see the EU after Brexit? Secondly, in this frame, there is hearsay about an alternative, quickened accession process for the Western Balkan countries to fill this vacuum. Does this rumour have any basis or it is just a wish, and enlargement will continue to follow its rocky course?

-Brexit has been an historical setback for the EU, and an historical catastrophe for the UK, and I say this with sadness. I see a silver lining for the European Union: the UK was always a reluctant European –the Recovery package probably would have never been reached with the UK sitting around the table. With the UK out, there is now an opportunity for the EU to move faster in areas like fiscal integration, digital taxation, security and defense, to name only a few.    

On the Western Balkans accession process, there are conflicting dynamics. On the one hand, the dynamism of the European Union has always been identified with its ability to combine deepening with enlargement, and the ambition of extending the pax Europea beyond its current borders. On the other hand, there is an entrenched enlargement fatigue, and the fact that the EU is on prolonged crisis mode for over a decade is not making the enlargement appetite any bigger. As you know the Commission has adopted the so-called “revised accession negotiation methodology”, seeking to maintain the momentum alive in spite of the various obstacles. I would say these obstacles are inevitable in a process where even a very small group of member states can always at the end of the day exercise blocking power.

-Four years of Mr. Donald Trump's rule in the US were considered the worst experience of EU-US relations. What are your expectations with President Joe Biden at the helm of the US administration? Will the shadows of so-called Trumpism continue to play a role?

-From the very beginning of his four-year term I was among those who viewed Trump as a direct threat to Euro-Atlantic relations, world peace and liberal democracy itself; he confirmed the worst expectations. President Biden is a return to normality: a responsible moderate leader, vastly experienced, with the greatest foreign policy experience from day one since George H.W. Bush senior. He is also a persuaded Euro-Atlanticist and supporter of a rules-based multilateral order, and a thoroughly decent man to boot. President Biden has done all the right things upon assuming office (returning to the Paris agreement and the WHO, indicating a return to the JCPOA, giving signs of cooperation over trade and digital taxation), and everything needed to assure America’s European partners of his commitment to a strong alliance. This does not mean that all differences have been eradicated: on a range of issues from China to Russia to protectionist tendencies, the US and the EU will continue to have distinct interests and legitimate policy disagreements. But as friends and partners again -not “foes”, as under Trump. My concern is different. The cult of Trumpism is still alive, and the Republican party remains hostage to this nativist, mendacious, authoritarian-leaning ideology. There is now a profound and legitimate concern among Western allies, that Trumpism, in one form or another, could return. This sustains unease among allies, despite the Biden administration’s best intentions and efforts: given the unprecedented polarization of the US political system, can Europe continue to count on the US on the longer run?

-There are high expectations that the scheduled Conference on the Future of Europe will become a harbinger of an EU renewal against the backdrop of the ‘lessons’ learned from the pandemic and some other events. According to you, Mr. Director, what might the new ‘face’ of the Union look like, given the ongoing democratic backsliding of several EU countries and the enlargement process?

-The Conference on the Future of Europe is an important opportunity to open the EU agenda to national and pan-European arenas, to listen to the citizens, and deliberate on the future of Europe. That said, my own expectations are not very high. The agenda has not been clearly defined, and it is not likely that it will include reforms that would require a treaty revision –which is practically out of the question. I am more optimistic as to the reforms that have been launched in response to the crisis, such as the important Recovery package or integration in health policy, as well as the reforms currently discussed regarding the fiscal framework. And of course the momentous Green New Deal and the digitization agenda that have been launched with the new EU budget. I see a continuing progress towards greater integration in all these fields, to which one should add the baby steps in EU defense integration and an EU defense industry. And other areas that are less visible but no less important. I would not expect great policy specificity to come out of the Future of Europe conference, and I am even less hopeful as to its ability to translate into real important reforms. But a democratic renewal and relegitimization of the European project through the pan-European involvement of European citizens would be a significant contribution of the conference. On that it would also serve to offset the democratic backsliding in certain “illiberal democracies” (by their own definition) that are among the EU member states. I also hope that the conference would renew support to further EU enlargement.

-The EU seems to find no peaceful relations with Russia even after the latest visit of the EU's foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, to Moscow. In your view, what have his talks with the Russian political elite produced? Do you think that Moscow is set to have its own way? If so how could Brussels act, as EU members are not unified about the way to approach Russia?

-Ι do not think the HRVP’s visit to Moscow produced much by way of positive results -and this is probably an understatement. The irony was that he went there in good will, to launch an improved partnership with Moscow, but was treated in a way that was broadly interpreted as demeaning. Targeted sanctions against specific officials over the Navalny case are now on the way. It is in the mutual interest of both EU and Russia to have a working relationship, and this is what both Berlin and Paris, have pursued. But Moscow has not made things easier, doing everything possible to justify the anti-Russian instincts of certain Central-Eastern European countries. Europeans know they cannot realistically expect Russia to become a fully-fledged liberal democracy by engaging it, but they want a working partnership with Russia, and they want to contain the aggressive expansion of its influence and its interference in domestic EU affairs. Given the divergence of views and interests between EU member states one cannot realistically demand of Brussels to be able to carry out a decisive and effective EU policy towards Russia. But an appropriate balance between a positive agenda and selective sanctions when needed is probably the path along which the EU will have to tread.

-Mr. Director, talks on the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) concluded on 30 December 2020. According to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the CAI would “provide unprecedented access to the Chinese market for European investors” and “rebalance Europe’s economic relationship with China''.  What is your opinion on this event and the future of relations between the Union and China? How might bilateral ties between China with individual EU countries develop given this event and perspective on relations; or given China's 17 + 1 and ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiatives?

-China is a “systemic rival” to the European Union and a security challenge. But it is also a trade partner, and a partner the EU wants to work within the framework of global multilateral institutions on issues such as climate, global health and trade. Contrary to Russia, a declining power which has not quite managed to disengage its economy from the high dependence on natural resources, the Chinese economy is rising, and with it its global political influence. The EU-China CAI is a good deal for European trade and investment to China. But it should not nurture excessive economic dependency on China. The EU has rightfully chosen not to bind itself to the Chinese 5G and AI technology, and to seek to promote its own digital industry. Europe should seek to counter the expansion of Chinese influence through the Belt and Road initiative by deploying its own investment and infrastructure projects in the EU periphery and neighborhood countries and in Africa. And the individual EU countries, especially those participating in the BRI, should resist bilateralism and seek to develop their relationship with China in the framework of a common EU policy towards Beijing.

-I cannot conclude this conversation with you, Honorable Director, without asking your opinion on the state of relations between Albania and Greece. Would you share with us your thoughts on the challenges and opportunities the two neighboring countries and their people face?

-Relations between our two countries are good and steadily improving. Albanian migrants in Greece are well integrated, contributing to both societies and economies and a bridge between the two peoples. Greece was an early champion of the European prospect of the Western Balkans, and remains a steady supporter of the accession process of both Albania and North Macedonia. An important step forward towards resolving bilateral issues has been made with the agreement to refer the delimitation of the maritime zones to the International Court in The Hague. This creates a positive momentum towards resolving further bilateral issues. The mutual gains of cooperation are obvious, and Albania’s EU orientation creates a converging strategic horizon. So I am optimistic overall.