The results of the latest high-level events in the frame of NATO and the EU as well as of the G7 Summit having the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its repercussions as the main issue were the gist of the conversation of Albanian Daily News with Professor Renata Mienkowska-Norkiene (Ph.D. in Political Science 2009) of the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw in Poland.  

“The situation in Ukraine is hard to foresee, Russia is an unpredictable enemy (which is this country's largest strength). It seems that NATO does a lot to avoid any provocations and it rather opts for supporting Ukraine and putting a new iron curtain on the border of NATO with Russia,” said the Professor who among others worked in the European Commission and she is also a member of a network of the European Commission’s experts – Team Europe.

An author of more than 70 scientific publications, Prof. Mienkowska-Norkiene praised the presence of the US Army V Corps in Poland which she considered as a guarantee, and according to her, the polls conducted in May 2022 showed that 80% of Poles support permanent presence of the US soldiers in Poland (before the Russian aggression it used to be around 65%).

According to her, the Visegrad Group has been since 2015 an unclear project with "strange" goals, and the Professor did not consider the V4 as a serious and internationally influential project in the following interview:     

Albanian Daily News: First of all, please, which is, according to you Madame Professor, the significance of the permanent stationing of the US Army V Corps forward command in Poland as announced recently by President Joe Biden, and how has such a move been assessed by the people, particularly the youth?

Warsaw University Professor Renata Mienkowska-Norkiene: The significance is huge as the hitherto NATO strategy in the region (Poland, the Baltics) was to retake already occupied territories of the NATO members and the new paradigm (after the Madrid Summit) is to immediately defend the territories invaded by the enemy. The presence of the US Army V Corps is a guarantee that this new strategy can be indeed applied. Regarding the public support for the US soldiers in Poland, according to the polls conducted in May 2022, 80% Poles support permanent presence of the US soldiers in Poland (before the Russian aggression it used to be around 65%). I think the youth (even the pacifistic part of this group) has lost any illusions that security is possible without its military guarantors in the region. So yes, the youth's support for the US Army presence in Poland is significant and it has grown recently due to the war.

- As we have you speaking from Warsaw, what could you, please, tell us on the mood among the people in Poland in face of the Russian aggression against Ukraine and how much are the people united around the government stance taking also into consideration the economic tight grip?

- There are different approaches towards Russian aggression on Ukraine in the Region (Visegrad Group, Baltic States). Poland and the Baltics definitely belong to the states (and the societies) fearing the potential Russian aggression the most. Therefore the public support for sending weapons to Ukraine and supporting Ukrainian refugees is significantly large (almost 70% of the Poles support weaponizing Ukraine). The Polish simply fear they might be the next Russian target. The people support the government's activities strengthening security (buying new equipment - also not without scandals like the purchase of the helicopters from the Italians actually without the public tender). However, it is worth noticing that this support does not mean unconditional acceptance for any government's activities (e.g. related to managing inflation). The government has a strong support on the level of around 35%-40%, but there is no guarantee that the Law and Justice would win the elections if they were to be conducted soon. The "flag effect" does not work unconditionally here.

- In the meantime the US would keep 100,000 troops in Europe for the "foreseeable future", up from 80,000 before the war in Ukraine began. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said the alliance was facing its biggest challenge since World War II because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Plans are made public of a sevenfold increase of the NATO troops in Europe. Which is the point of view from Warsaw on the current military beef up by NATO and do you foresee a military clash between the Alliance and Russia which borders your country? 

- The situation in Ukraine is hard to foresee, Russia is an unpredictable enemy (which is this country's largest strength). It seems that NATO does a lot to avoid any provocations and it rather opts for supporting Ukraine and putting a new iron curtain on the border of NATO with Russia. However, Ukraine and its fate are crucial here. Belarus has been getting new weapons and equipment (allegedly including atomic bombs) from Russia, which may mean that Russia is planning some new moves - maybe also including some provocative actions on the Polish border near Suwalki. Lithuanian blockade of Kaliningrad transit may give some excuse for Putin to conduct some unexpected moves. If the clash was to take place, it would be probably somewhere near Kaliningrad in Poland or Lithuania, maybe some "Russian rockets that went astray over Poland or Lithuania". The Finnish MFA has stated that in his opinion Russia may conduct such actions towards NATO states. So, obviously, the Polish support the NATO presence in as large numbers as necessary to be able to prevent these kinds of behaviors of Putin. The big question is also Putin's potential use of atomic bombs in Ukraine (e.g. near Poland) or chemical weapons. What will NATO do then?

The Polish seem to rather opt for any possible kind of support to Ukraine and as strong sanctions as possible. Therefore, the German Chancellor's expressions about Lithuania's blockade on Russian transit to Kaliningrad (that the transit should be enabled) is considered in Poland to be a kind of German betrayal.

- North Macedonia backed the compromise plan with Bulgaria on July 1, opening the way for EU membership for Skopje. Albania’s EU membership bid has been linked with North Macedonia, so progress on Skopje’s accession plan means also unlocking Tirana’s EU bid. Madame Professor, do you think that these developments as well as the candidate status for Ukraine will bring a change to the architecture of the EU? I have in mind the fact that there are 49 proposals adopted by the one-year long Conference on the Future of Europe. Are we witnessing a reshaping of Europe, and why not of the entire world order?

- This question is incredibly important and the possible answers are not easy to formulate. But to make the long story short I think we have recently been facing the so called "window of opportunity" for the EU to speed up its integration and extend its borders. Sure, it will take a lot of time, but...

First of all, a status of a candidate for Ukraine and Moldova (in a short perspective also Georgia) have both made North Macedonia and Albania angry as well as made these countries intensify their efforts to make their accession more a project than a dream. It may work - Serbia seems to be lost but accession of Albania and North Macedonia to the EU could also make Serbia change this pro-Russian and pro-Chinese shift. And for the EU potential accession of Albania and North Macedonia could be a good opportunity to strengthen its safety in the South (Albania is already a NATO member so it is not that exotic after all). The way for Ukraine and Moldova to the EU seems to be long and painful but there is a consensus of the EU societies over their potential accession so the core aspect here is the end of the war. If it becomes a frozen conflict, it will be difficult to finish the accession, so the challenge for the EU is a strong cooperation with NATO (in particular the US) to defeat Russia. Unfortunately, Macron lost his influence in France and in Europe, Scholz seems to dream about coming back to business as usual with Russia just with less trust, the EU institutions are not strong enough to deepen the sanctions at any cost and wait long to see their fruits, so the situation is more than problematic. However, the CoE has shown that there is a will of the Europeans to deepen the integration in Europe, the EU institutions have a mandate to introduce new tools of cooperation in broader areas without changing the Treaties and there is a big chance that the healthcare-, security-, economic cooperation will get deepened, the unanimity in many areas will be replaced by the QMV, that the EU will gain new impetus to operate worldwide as a significant actor setting up standards. But the BRICS countries seem to form a camp backing Russia, China gets more and more determined to fight with the West. Russia may win the war in Ukraine regarding full take of Donbas and Luhansk... (plus it has already taken Crimea and still going towards conquering the full coastline of Ukraine). So the international situation does not look good.

The problem is the communication of the EU institutions to the Europeans. The impact should be placed more explaining that certain devotions (larger oil and gas prices, inflation) are the costs of security and safety. This is not yet something broadly understood by the Europeans in the West. But it is still better understood by the people than by the politicians. E.g. German Chancellor is not supported in his actions regarding Ukraine by the German society and the German media. But still he is not particularly determined to opt for full weakening Russia and defeating it at any cost.

- Visegrad Group has been, in my opinion, an example of how four countries, all EU and NATO members, cooperate in a pragmatic way, being smart enough to face different sensitive challenges within its ranks without breaking up. If there is an exemplary case of the triumph of the motto: ‘agree to disagree’ on certain issues, that is V4. But the stance towards Russian aggression on Ukraine has been a special case raising broader questions like never before. In a few words, Madame Professor, how deep are the convergences and divergences among the V4 members regarding this issue and others in a world that is changing too fast? How can the V4 continue?

- Here, Mr. Mlloja, I have to strongly disagree with you. The V4 has been for me since 2015 an unclear project with "strange" goals. The divisions within the V4 have always been there, just in different areas. Maybe the biggest significance V4 has had in some infrastructural projects, in support for certain NGOs initiatives (Visegrad grants) and as a "symbolic" political project "supporting" democratic backsliding in Hungary, Poland and in some aspects also in Slovakia and Czech Republic (to a much smaller extent, though). So I do not consider V4 a serious and internationally influential project. And yes, recently the pro-Russian course of Hungary has shown how weak and superficial the V4 as a project is and how little potential it has actually had to influence the security or economic situation in the region. Even if some V4+ configurations have been successful in some aspects, it does not make the whole project worth considering significant Europe wide or internationally.

- V4 has been very helpful to the Western Balkans, and according to regional authorities its support is more valuable than ever, particularly under the current circumstances in the region, Europe and beyond. Do you think all V4 members are interested in pursuing the previous supportive stance or there are nuances on this issue in the group due to their own ‘headaches’?

- As I have already said, I can see separate states of V4 supporting the Balkan efforts but not really the V4 as a whole. The problem for the Balkan states in their pursuit for accession to the EU has actually been Bulgaria (although it is a huge simplification as it is now anti-Russian and this will influence its course towards support for the Western Balkans to join the EU) and some Greek requirements, plus diversity within the group (Serbia differs from Albania and North Macedonia). I think now, regarding the security aspects, all the V4 countries will opt for enlargement of the EU, but Hungary is still an unpredictable state in this regard. In my opinion the Balkan EU candidates should rather seek for support on bilateral level. I would still expect going on with the support for the enlargement in all these states as this is something crucial for the security.

- There have been a string of proposals involving countries aspiring to join the EU during their course. The last one has been the proposal of France on the establishment of the ‘European Geopolitical Community’. Which are the objectives and perspectives of such a new platform, and how does Warsaw eye this new initiative? 

- Warsaw opts for full membership of those states in the EU. EGC is actually a strange construct which Macron came up with to strengthen his position before the parliamentary elections in France. This would mean differentiated integration which Poland is not a fan of (but actually our government participates in it by not accepting Euro and not being a member of the European Prosecutor's scheme, not to speak about not sticking to the EU values and not implementing the CJEU rulings). France and Germany are considered suspicious regarding the question of Ukraine for the Polish, which is related to history and to lack of understanding of the West towards the Polish fear of Russia (it seems we were right in this regard).

- Sweden and Finland have already been invited to join NATO, a move which has irritated Russia. In the meantime, NATO agreed on a new Strategic Concept on June 29, 2022,) which marks Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to allies’ security and stability.” In addition, for the first time, NATO’s long-term planning document also includes a mention of China, declaring that Beijing’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” Which is your comment, Madam Professor on these remarkable approaches?  

- I think it is a wise move of NATO. The threat has been named and it makes the situation clearer. This, obviously, means a new cold war between the East and the West and reshapes the whole security architecture in the world. However, this approach has strong strategic and tactical consequences which are significant for the people. This means the Western societies will not live in such a peace and welfare as before, huge money will be spent on military development, Russia will always be a potential aggressor. The G7 states have allocated 600 billion EUR on support for developing countries to balance the Chinese Road and Belt initiative. All this has meant the new situation - no more sound sleep. But NATO is not only the US and the West. It is also Turkey which can be potentially unpredictable (it has blocked Sweden and Finland for some time). But it does not seem it will leave the Pact. In any case, it is a good shift in NATO development - a necessary one. No more pretending that Russia and China can be anyhow tamed. The question is still whether NATO and the EU can be attractive to the developing countries so that they want to rather join "our block" than Russia and China. Hopefully the NATO and the EU show they can, but then they need to improve their own credibility: keep promises, enlarge, deepen the integration, stick to Western values, protect democracy, and maintain freedom.