Albanian Daily News had an extensive interview with the Chargé d'affaires of Poland, Wojciech Unolt. During the conversation many issues were discussed, first of all the state of relations between Albania and Poland.  
"Historically our relations have been very good, and that legacy is still a point of reference for both sides. But I think it is more relevant to point out to current issues that determine the importance of Albania for Poland and vice versa and that are always on top of the agenda in our bilateral conversations", the Polish diplomat said in the following interview:  

- Mr Unolt, thanj you for this interview with ADN, please could you share with our readers your opinions on some important issues, and first of all what could you say about the progress of the traditional relations between Albania and Poland in 2024 and their perspective in 2025? Albanian and Polish old friendly ties dating back centuries ago could be described as exemplary in history annals.  
- In terms of diplomatic relations in 2024 we had two high-level events: President Bajram Begaj visited Poland in July and Polish Foreign Minister Rados?aw Sikorski was in Tirana in December. This year we have already hosted in Warsaw the Albanian Deputy Minister for European and Foreign Affairs Ms. Megi Fino and quite recently the Parliament’s Speaker Ms. Elisa Spiropali. More high-level encounters are in the pipeline, as we plan to further enhance bilateral cooperation and Poland’s support to Albania’s EU accession efforts.  
Yes, historically our relations have been very good, and that legacy is still a point of reference for both sides. But I think it is more relevant to point out to current issues that determine the importance of Albania for Poland and vice versa, and that are always on top of the agenda in our bilateral conversations. 
From our perspective, Albania is a crucial actor in maintaining the regional stability in the Western Balkans, very much needed these days when in our region we face a direct threat from Russia, and the European neighborhood has become increasingly unstable with the war in Gaza and conflicts in the Middle East and Africa. 
We highly appreciate Albania as a loyal NATO partner, whose position on major issues is fully aligned with ours: Albania condemns Russian unlawful aggression against Ukraine, it has introduced all international sanctions against the aggressor, supports Ukraine, contributes to maintain and strengthen the transatlantic bond with the United States. And Albania is at the very center of a momentous geopolitical process currently involving Europe, namely the new EU enlargement.  A process with two vectors – the East-European and the Balkan – that we consider equally important for our interests and that we intend to assist. 
A relatively recent new development in Polish-Albanian relations is the rapid growth of the number of Polish tourists visiting Albania – last year they were 314 thousand, and the forecasts for this year go as far as 400 thousand. Poles are said to have been the pioneers of mass tourism in Albania, those who actually discovered Albania as an attractive tourist destination and initiated the current touristic boom. At present, many Poles begin to invest in Albania, buying apartments and opening businesses. We expect that this new interest in Albania will eventually boost our bilateral economic exchange and investments, an area with a large still untapped potential. 
So, to answer your question – the perspectives for progress in our relations are very promising: we have convergent interests, joint positions on major international issues, we can offer each other substantial support in various domains. All in all, there is enough substance to talk about and to work on. 

- Poland has supported Albania in its endeavor to join the EU since the very beginning of the process. Given the situation in the EU, the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine and of the new American administration, do you expect that Albania will join the EU in 2030 as projected? As a follow up how is Poland helping Albania to make possible that endeavor?  
- It is true that the accession process of Albania and other Western Balkan nations has rapidly accelerated since 2022 that is after the Russian aggression against Ukraine and in a way as a consequence of it. The completion of the European integration project is now seen as a “geopolitical imperative”, a process meant to stabilize the whole continent, to render it more resilient and competitive and to protect it from unwanted external pressures. 
This said, this new phase of the EU enlargement, just like the previous ones, will be a success and will produce the desired benefits for all stakeholders only if it remains a merit-based process. A process whereby the candidate countries adopt and implement the acquis communautaire and fulfill the necessary criteria. The geopolitical necessity does not mean that these requirements should be somehow waived or relaxed. 
To the contrary: if we think of enlargement as an investment in Europe’s stability and security, then we must keep in mind that it is the rule of law that remains the cornerstone of stability and mutual trust in the Union. It is the respect of human rights and principles of democracy that underpins our sense of security. Our common task is to uphold standards of the rule of law, strengthen the resilience of democracy and promote commitment to EU values.  
The EU side, including the current Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, has done a lot to streamline and accelerate the procedures, the result being that Albania has already opened the first and the sixth negotiating clusters, the second and the third cluster are in the pipeline, the opening of the remaining two is possible within the current year. 
But our own experience tells us that opening the clusters is actually the easy part. The real challenge begins when it comes to adopting all the necessary legislation and reforms and – more importantly – to actually changing the realities on the ground in line with European standards. This process took Poland several years – we started the negotiations in December 1997 and actually joined the Union in May 2004, more than six and a half years later. I think Albania’s declared objective to join the EU in 2030 is very ambitious, but realistic. 
Poland is ready and willing to assist Albania in making this happen. There is a number of reasons why Poland can be Albania’s privileged partner in this endeavor. To some extent we share a similar historical legacy – that of the Communist past, which left its traces in both our countries. Apart from that, our own accession experience is relatively fresh, we have vast expertise and institutional memory on how to handle the accession negotiations from the side of a candidate country. People who presided over the process of legislation adjustment and reform implementation are still active and willing to share their knowledge. And then, the twenty years of our EU membership have been an extraordinary success story in terms of my country’s capacity to fully benefit from it – absorbing the EU cohesion funds, entering the common market, attracting investments. I think Poland can offer Albania an attractive model to follow. 
To assist Albania, we can use the usual instruments that the EU puts at our disposal – like the TAIEX and Twinning projects which we have already implemented several times in Albania. We are currently in conversation with the Albanian authorities to determine the specific areas when our expertise could be most useful. Minister Sikorski during his visit to Tirana last year presented a list of Polish institutions and experts ready to offer assistance, and we are now awaiting the Albanian response. 
We also have our own instruments like the Enlargement Academy, a project run by the Polish Diplomatic Academy, where we invite diplomats from candidate countries to follow courses on aspects of European integration. Another particular program is a seminary on “Remembrance, Understanding, Future” at Krzy?owa – a place which is a symbol of Polish-German reconciliation. Each year young people from Western Balkan countries, Germany and Poland meet there to explore experiences of reconciliation between nations – an issue that I think is of great relevance in the Western Balkans. 
Poland remains an active contributor to the Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF) and we are open to support infrastructural projects in Albania within this instrument.  
On our initiative, the OECD has prepared a report (Scoreboard) that standardizes the economic data obtained for the Western Balkans. This report will be important in the context of the ongoing accession negotiations and the implementation of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. 

- As a follow up how do you assess the situation in the Western Balkans, especially the tense relations between Kosovo and Serbia?  
- The Polish presidency has started a very intense semester in enlargement, with negotiation clusters for Albania, Serbia, North Macedonia and chapter for Montenegro already on the Council table. Our intention is to push for concrete progress in accession negotiations across the board – both with Western Balkans partners as well as Ukraine and Moldova. 
It is very unfortunate though that in some cases bilateral disputes hinder accession negotiation process. This should not be happening anymore. Some of these disputes are rooted in old animosities, memories of past conflicts, mutual mistrust. Such problems cannot be tackled or resolved simply by new legislation, not even the future EU accession may be a remedy here. In reality, the accession should be preceded by a real reconciliation between all parties involved. 
No one has to convince us that reconciliation is a very difficult process. Poland’s path to the EU did not began only in the 1990s. It wouldn’t have been possible without the reconciliation initiated already in 1965 by Polish Catholic bishops, who wrote to their German counterparts: "We forgive and ask for forgiveness." Those words were addressed to a country that had just twenty years earlier caused the death of 6 million Polish citizens. To pronounce such words in 1965 in Poland was an act of great courage, Polish public opinion was not at all ready for such a gesture and the then communist authorities reacted with outrage. Yet without that letter, Polish-German reconciliation wouldn’t have become a reality. Without this reconciliation, Germany wouldn’t have become Poland’s strongest advocate for EU membership. 
Most, if not all, EU member states had to achieve something extraordinary to become part of the European family. The signing of Treaties of Rome had to be preceded by the Franco-German reconciliation. Countries like Greece, Spain and Portugal had to dismantle military dictatorships.  
Today the new candidate countries must confront their own challenges. We have to imagine the Balkans, where Serbia and Kosovo manage to normalize their relations; where Bosnia and Herzegovina overcomes its internal divisions and —possibly faster than seems possible now — appoints a chief negotiator and agrees on a negotiation framework. 
The beginning of the new institutional cycle in the EU, with the appointment of new commissioner for enlargement, as well as the general understanding that the enlargement has become a “geopolitical necessity” – all these factors contribute to create a window of opportunity for the candidate countries. It is crucial that they seize the present opportunity as this momentum will not last forever. 

- Poland took over the rotating presidency of the EU Council on January 1, 2025 under the slogan "Security, Europe!’ In the meantime, the situation has become more complex after the conflict between the US and Ukraine. Nevertheless, what could you tell us about the so far achievements regarding some of your priorities: 1) EU defence; (2) the stability of Europe’s borders with the development of new infrastructure projects; (3) fight against disinformation and information manipulation; and (4) the guarantee of energy supplies after the final withdrawal from Russian imports?  
- I think the EU has made substantial progress in some of these areas. In the first three months of this year two consecutive European Council meetings, on February 3rd and March 6th, have approved basic directives for EU action in the field of defence. Council conclusions on continuing support for Ukraine have also been supported by 26 member states. The White Book on Defence, published on March 19th, indicates specific actions to be taken by Member States and EU institutions to boost Europe’s defence capabilities and increase the potential of defence industries. The conclusions of the European Council meeting on March 20-21 go in the same direction. 
European Parliament’s resolution voted on March 12 calls on the EU to co-finance the Polish project named East Shield – a large infrastructural program that aims to enhance the security of Poland's border with Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, through a mix of modern surveillance systems, physical barriers, and infrastructure development. The project is to be implemented in the years 2024-2028 with an investment of around 2.5 billion EUR by the Polish government. The White Book on Defence refers explicitly to this project and recognizes its importance for the security of Europe. 
In the field of energy important decisions have been made to provide more substantive and more readily accessible funding to Moldova in the framework of the Reform and Growth Instrument. These funds will finance a special strategy meant to enhance Moldova’s energy independence and resilience and to reduce to zero the country’s dependence on Russian energy supplies. 
As for countering FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference), the Polish Presidency has introduced to the Council discussions the topic of a more systemic and better resourced cooperation with the civil society. It is a bit early to speak about concrete achievements. There is a broad consensus on the direction but operational details still need to be worked out in the coming months. We are also in talks with the European Commission and the European Parliament about the possibility to include a strengthened cooperation with the civil society as an element of the envisaged European Democracy Shield. 

- To touch upon the Ukrainian war and its repercussions. In this frame, what is the general feeling of the Russian aggression amidst Polish people whose country is in the front line with Russia as immediate neighbor? Do they feel worried that Russia could undertake any adventure against Poland and do they reply on an assistance of NATO and especially of the US and President Trump in the new circumstances?  
- The essential underlying problem with Russia is that it continues to be an inherently imperialist and neocolonial state. While other colonial powers from the past have long ago realized that the colonial paradigm is obsolete and they have found new ways to sustain their growth and prosperity, Russia has remained stuck in the old imperialist logic: Russia’s leadership seems unable to think of new ways to promote their country’s interest other than conquering new territories, grabbing other nations’ resources, exerting control over what they claim to be their “sphere of influence”, toppling unfriendly governments and imposing puppet regimes. 
So yes, Russia as we know it today is a matter of concern, not just because of its current aggression against Ukraine, and not just for Poland. It is a general threat to the rule-based world order, a threat that the international community will have to confront and contain even after the current war is over. 
This said, we are not afraid. Poland’s security and defence policy is based on two pillars: Transatlantic and European. Our commitment to NATO and bilateral relations with the US is unwavering. Despite some turbulences in transatlantic relations, we stay focused on our major common goal: security and prosperity for both Europe and America. 
We understand that US wants Europe to take more responsibility for its own security and we will act to achieve that, both though security cooperation at EU level and on bilateral basis. European defence efforts should fully reflect the European economic potential, which is comparable to that of the US and much bigger than that of Russia. If all European nations unite their rearmament efforts and stand ready to take responsibility for our own security into our own hands, Russia will not be tempted to test our determination. Poland is in the lead with its defence budget of 4.7% GDP.  
At the same time, increased European defence efforts must not be interpreted as an incentive for the US to reduce its engagement in NATO. On the contrary, in the face of threats to transatlantic security, Poland will seek European and transatlantic unity. 

- Some EU and non-EU countries discuss the possibility of stationing a peacekeeping force in Ukraine. What could you tell us about this and Poland's stance?  
- We do not intend to deploy Polish troops to Ukraine as a part of any peace plan. The protection of NATO and EU external border with Russia and Belarus, which is also the Polish border, is the priority for our armed forces. However, when a decision is taken to send European forces to Ukraine, we stand ready to provide support when it comes to logistics, staging and sustainment. 

- The heated clash between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy sparked mixed reactions in the EU countries with some (Hungary) backing Trump, while most of the member states support the Ukrainian leader. What is the stance of Poland, a strongly pro-American country?  
- We welcome the agreement between the US and Ukraine reached during the talks in Jeddah, in particular the resumption of the US military assistance and intelligence sharing with Ukraine. 
As to the new ceasefire initiative currently on the table: We are certainly interested in putting an end to the war. But we should not look for temporary solutions. The ultimate goal needs to be a comprehensive and durable peace, which respects all basic international rules and Ukrainian sovereignty. A peace that is concluded with the participation of Ukraine. What is at stake is not only the independence of Ukraine, but also the future of European security. Poland and other European countries stand ready to help achieve such a just and long-lasting peace. 
On the other side, there are no signs of President Putin’s will for de-escalation. To the contrary, Russia has recently scaled up its aerial campaign against civilians, including strikes on residential houses, medical facilities, educational institutions, and the energy sector across Ukraine. President Zelenskyy is right when he says that Pres. Putin does not want any ceasefire because he “needs war”. This is in line with what we said before about the inherently imperialist nature of Russia. President Putin’s evasive response to the proposal of a 30-days ceasefire and Russia’s instant violation even of the very limited agreement on suspension of attacks on energy infrastructure, is yet another proof of that. 

- Given what is happening across the world with several ongoing conflicts in many fields, do you think that it's high time for a new global order based on new foundations? 
- Depending on what you mean. The current international order was created in response to the atrocities of the Second World War. Its foundation is the international law which remains the best bulwark against war and injustice. It is the framework through which states can resolve conflicts, address global challenges and safeguard human rights. 
So, if you are asking me whether we need a new global order based on principles other than international law and the UN Charter, then the answer is no: the existing foundations of the global order are something we should cherish and protect at all costs.  
What does need change and reform are some of the institutions originally created to apply and enforce the international law. Within the UN system it is the Security Council that is supposed to safeguard the order based on international law and enshrined in the UN Charter. But today we face the situation where one of the permanent members constantly violates the Charter. Russia, with its full-scale aggression against Ukraine, blatantly disregards supposedly sacrosanct principles such as the prohibition of the use force, sovereign equity and territorial integrity. With Russia’s abdication from the role of be the guardian of the UN Charter, and with its irresponsible use of the veto, the Security Council has become dysfunctional.  
It is also true that since the foundation of the United Nations exactly 80 years ago, the geopolitical realities have greatly changed, especially with the emergence of several new powerful actors who feel they are not adequately represented in the current UN system. We cannot ignore the fact that many countries rightly demand greater representation in UN institutions.  
So what is needed, is not the change of foundations, but a debate on rational reforms aimed at improving the effectiveness of the UN Security Council and other main bodies of the United Nations.  There are several ways to achieve this, such as regulating the use of veto, increasing the number of SC members, particularly non-permanent members, and adjusting its working methods – but let’s not get too technical here. The important thing is that we do not need a revolution or a disruption of the system, but rather its gradual improvement, always anchored in the principles of international law, which remain universally valid.