Professor Agon Demjaha of the Tetovo University in North Macedonia sees this Balkan country as institutionally stable staying on its path towards the opening of the EU accession talks. But the main obstacle in this direction is still the Republic of Bulgaria, which has for more than a year blocked North Macedonia’s EU path over an unresolved history and identity dispute, said the Professor in an exclusive interview with Albanian Daily News.

But, according to Professor Demjaha, there seems to be light at the end of the tunnel, especially after the visit to Skopje of a high-level delegation led by Prime Minister Petkov on January 18th. According to him, there are some positive signs that Bulgaria might de-block North Macedonia’s path towards the EU, and he praised the creation of bilateral working groups for closer cooperation on economic issues, trade, education, European integration, culture and history.

Dwelling on the current situation in Montenegro, the political researcher, Demjaha was of the opinion that the current government is endangering country’s path towards the EU and its Western orientation. According to him, this is the reason why former deputy PM Dritan Abazovic “rebelled” and asked for the creation of a minority government.  

Professor Demjaha was pleased about the relations between Albania and North Macedonia despite certain ups and downs.  But after the “Ohrid Agreement” in 2001, and especially in recent years when Albanian politicians hold very important positions in the North Macedonian government, Albanians living in this country have undoubtedly served as a connecting bridge between the two countries and have contributed to the improvement of their bilateral relations, said Professor Agon Demjaha at the Tetovo University in the following interview:   

Albanian Daily News: As this is the first time to have you as a guest to Albanian Daily News, and it is very kind of you, could you please, Mr. Professor, reveal some details of your professional career and which are some of the main fields of interest of your studies?

Professor Agon Demjaha:  I thank you for this opportunity trying to be brief on your question leaving space for other extremely important issues. So, I hold an MA with distinction in International Relations and European Studies and PhD in Political Sciences. During 2006-2010, I have served as the Ambassador of the Republic of North Macedonia to the Kingdom of Sweden. I have also been engaged as an advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo.  Currently, I work as an Associate Professor at the Tetovo University. My main interests include ethnic relations, conflict prevention and resolution, comparative politics and regional cooperation.

- Now let me touch on the current situation of North Macedonia’s political scene and in your view does the confrontation between the majority and opposition affect the path of the country towards the opening of the EU accession talks?                

- I believe that with the creation of the new government, North Macedonia has managed to avoid institutional instability and eventual early elections, and has thus stayed on its path towards the opening of the EU accession talks. Moreover, after “Alternativa” party joined the government coalition, the majority has strengthened further. Thus the newly elected government headed by Prime minister Kovacevski has a full and legitimate mandate to continue its efforts towards the opening of the EU accession talks. The main obstacle in this direction is still the Republic of Bulgaria, which has for more than a year blocked North Macedonia’s EU path over an unresolved history and identity dispute.    

- As a follow up, Sir, do you see any opportunity that there would be a breakthrough to the Bulgarian veto after the visit of Sofia’s Prime Minister Kiril Petkov to Skopje a few days ago, and which are some of the flexibilities shown by both sides to arrive at an eventual compromise?

- After the election of the new government in Bulgaria, there are some positive signs that Bulgaria might de-block North Macedonia’s path towards the EU. The Bulgarian Prime minister, Petkov has during the election campaign emphasized that he is not in favour of holding relations with North Macedonia hostage to a clashing interpretation of history and language. After assuming office, he stated that he wished to reinvigorate stale talks with North Macedonia that may result in a breakthrough within the next six months. The visit to Skopje on January 18th of a high-level delegation led by Prime Minister Petkov, undoubtedly represents an encouraging step. Moreover, just hours prior to Petkov’s visit, the government in Skopje made a first step toward compromise by informing the United Nations that the name "North Macedonia" and its lengthier version "Republic of North Macedonia" refer only to the country and not to the wider geographical region. 

Instead of focusing exclusively on unresolved historical disputes, the two Prime ministers also agreed to have a joint meeting in Sofia and form working groups for closer cooperation on economic issues, trade, education, European integration, culture and history. The meeting of the two governmental delegations in Sofia on January 24th further sparked hope of improved Bulgaria-North Macedonia relations. During this visit, three new memorandums were signed – to develop a closer partnership in agriculture, finish the not-yet-completed railway Sofia - Skopje and Sofia, and support small and middle-sized businesses in both countries. Prime Minister Petkov also mentioned that the working groups engaged with resolving the disputes between the two countries will meet at least three times during the next four months, thus boosting the optimism for eventual breakthrough in relations between the two countries.

- Mr. Professor, what could you say on the latest developments in Montenegro and which might be some of the reasons that the former ally of the coalition government deputy PM Dritan Abazovic ‘rebelled’ asking for the creation of a minority government?  Secondly, Brussels and Washington have hastened to announce their interest in a Western –oriented Montenegro. In this frame, how do you consider the comment of EP Rapporteur for Montenegro Tonino Picula whereby the country has been in a political vacuum for a long time, in which its progress and the realization of European ambitions are not realistic?

- Obviously, the coalition parties that formed the new government in Montenegro in December 2020 were mainly driven by their mutual opposition against Djukanovic’s DPS and the fight against corruption in the country. Nevertheless, it was clear that such government, composed of ideologically distant Democratic Front, the Democrats, and URA Movement, would be facing difficulties and internal disagreements. Stark differences were especially obvious between Prime Minister’s Krivokapic Democratic Front and Abazovic’s URA, particularly about very important issues such as NATO membership and overall Western orientation of the country. When the deputy PM, Dritan Abazovic realized the current government is endangering country’s path towards the EU and its Western orientation, he “rebelled” and asked for the creation of a minority government that would include all parties except the largest ruling coalition, the Democratic Front, DF, as well as the main opposition DPS.

The comment of EP Rapporteur for Montenegro Tonino Picula that the country has been in a political vacuum for a long time, in which its progress and the realization of European ambitions are not realistic is basically in line with the above. We should recall that in its October 2021 report, European Commission clearly stated that “heated relations and mistrust fed frequent escalations and further exacerbated political divisions, including within the ruling majority”, and that the “friction between the executive and legislative powers has slowed down reform work”. The EU Special Representative Laj?ák as well as Picula and Bil?ík as members of the European Parliament made it clear that they would welcome any proposal that would unblock the current stalemate on EU reforms. Personally, I see this as a direct support to Abazovic’s initiative for the creation of the minority government.  

- In the meantime, Mr. Demjaha do you think that the pro-Serb wing in the government and the Orthodox Church have gone too far affecting the orientation of Montenegro towards the EU (80 percent of the population support EU accession) and the West in general in their endeavor to put Podgorica under the influence of Belgrade and Moscow?

-As I mentioned earlier, the Democratic Front as one of the government coalition parties is not only pro-Serb, but it is very much against Montenegro pro-Western orientation, including its membership in NATO. On the other hand, during the wars in 1990s, the Serbian Orthodox Church was very active in promoting the nationalistic idea of unifying all Serbs in one state. Since due to the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural composition of the region this could not be achieved without the war, with that idea the Orthodox Church has directly contributed to ethnic cleansing that happened during the wars. In the case of the Law on Religious Freedom in Montenegro, the Serbian Orthodox Church has reacted fiercely and contributed to the escalation of tensions in the country, simply because such law has shaken the special privileged status that SOC has enjoyed. Through such a status, the SOC was often able to obstruct certain actions enacted by the Montenegrin government that lead the state closer to more secular, European and more liberal values, but also spread and strengthen the national feeling among Montenegrins.

It should be emphasized that both the Democratic Front and the Serbian Orthodox Church have acted in close cooperation with the Serbian state and government. On the other hand, the Serbian government has closely collaborated with Russia in its efforts to destabilize Montenegro. Moscow has backed a coup attempt in Montenegro in 2016, and has since continuously engaged in subversive and destabilizing activities in the country. Obviously, the final goal of these actions is to separate Montenegro from Western influence and put it under Serbian and Russian control. 

- Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ongoing dispute between Pristina and Belgrade, the fragile situation in Presevo Valley in Serbia- do all of these constitute conflicts questioning claims that the situation in the Western Balkans is calm and peaceful?

- Well, ongoing tensions in all these countries of the region clearly show that for some time Western Balkans is on the brink of destabilization, thus refuting eventual claims that the situation in the region is calm and peaceful. The Serbian government is actively backing efforts to destabilize these countries, supporting internal proxies, and threatening their sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is worth noting that all these destabilizing actions are directly linked with the concept of the “Serb world”, an idea which is frighteningly similar to “Greater Serbia” of former President Slobodan Milosevic.

At the same time, Russian meddling, NATO weakness and divisions within the EU are further deteriorating the situation. The progress that was made in the region toward peaceful, prosperous, multiethnic states in the 2000s is unfortunately being reversed, and the entire Western Balkans is once again in turmoil. Unless NATO, US and the EU urgently begin acting together to protect the progress that was made earlier, the situation in the entire region might further escalate. The recent new American approach in the Western Balkans that focus on resolving different remaining crisis areas in the region offers some hope for the future. On the one hand, the US has undertaken a major personnel reset of the American diplomatic team in charge of the Western Balkans. On the other hand, it has blacklisted a number of individuals in the Western Balkans based on their role in the destabilization of the democratic process in the region.

- Professor, let me turn to the relations between North Macedonia and Greece and the Prespa Agreement sealed in 2018. First, why did the breakthrough between the two countries take so long, and secondly, in your view is the accord delivering, which leads me to raise the issue: can it be an example for the resolution to conflicts in the region?

- Unfortunately, since the Interim Accord of 1995 between North Macedonia and Greece, a very long period of time was lost on UN mediated negotiations between the two countries. Personally, I believe that political elites in North Macedonia were hoping that by acquiring a large number of bilateral recognitions of its constitutional name, Greece would eventually accept such reality as well.

After the Greek veto at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, and especially after Greece blocked the beginning of accession negotiations with EU in 2009, then the VMRO-led government has instead of intensifying negotiations with Greece, unfortunately opted for the radicalization of bilateral relations. Under the guise of fake patriotism and nationalism, it has started the so-called process of the “antiquisation”. Such process included identity policies that were based on the assumption that there is a direct link between today's ethnic Macedonians and Ancient Macedonians. In addition to embracing the recollection of the alleged ancient heritage of the Ancient Macedonians, this nationalist process also sought to depict a coherent continuity of history from the ancient Kingdom of Macedon until the modern state of Macedonia. It included a “state-framed set of actions” such as direct interventions in the public space and in the public sphere of the society in general.

When in 2017, the SDSM-led government came to power it engaged seriously in ending the name dispute with Greece. As a result, in 2018 the two countries signed the “Prespa Agreement” under the auspices of the United Nations. According to the agreement, “Republic of Macedonia” changed its constitutional name to “Republic of North Macedonia” (erga omnes), while Greece committed not to block North Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. As a result, North Macedonia became a full NATO member, and instead of opposing, Greece is now supporting its path towards EU. The Agreement was unequivocally supported by the international community in general, and by Euro-Atlantic partners of Greece in particular. It is believed that the Agreement could serve as a model for the resolution of other existing conflicts in the region. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the citizens in both countries were not too supportive of the Agreement. This being said, when the agreement was signed, the Prime ministers Zaev and Tsipras have shown great courage and obviously risked loss of popular support for their political parties. 

- Staying in the region, Professor, how do you assess the current relations between Albania and North Macedonia, which if we look back in time have had their ups and downs? How much and in what way can Albanians living in North Macedonia contribute much more to the improvement of the bilateral relations?

- Despite certain ups and downs, I believe that bilateral relations between Albania and North Macedonia have in general been quite good. Let’s not forget that when Macedonia declared its independence in 1991, contrary to other neighbours, Albania recognized both the Macedonian state and nation. Both countries are NATO members and since their bids for EU membership have been coupled together, both are still not able to begin EU accession negotiations. Most of the time, the two countries have had good political and economic relations, and the number of tourists on two sides of the border is constantly increasing.

The large number of Albanians living in North Macedonia has since 1991 played an important role in bilateral relations between the two countries. Most of the times they have contributed to the improvement of these relations, but sometimes they have also caused tensions between the two countries, i.e. during the conflict in 2001 or in 2017 relayed to the so-called “Tirana Platform”. Since its independence, Albania has made it clear to North Macedonia that its goodwill would greatly depend on the status of the Albanians living in the country. After the “Ohrid Agreement” in 2001, and especially in recent years when Albanian politicians hold very important positions in the North Macedonian government, Albanians living in North Macedonia have undoubtedly served as a connecting bridge between the two countries and have contributed to the improvement of their bilateral relations.