Among the most consequential debates in international relations and geopolitical thought during the last three decades has been the assumption that technological modernity and economic rationality would inevitably diminish the influence of traditional national ideologies.

But modern geopolitical projects are rarely sustained by military capacity alone. They require an intellectual architecture capable of transforming territorial ambition into historical necessity. In this context, ideological constructs regain strategic significance. Contemporary Russian geopolitical thought, particularly in its neo-imperial dimensions, has sought to reinterpret the post-Cold War order through civilizational categories transcending ordinary diplomacy. Such narratives do not merely seek influence; they seek legitimacy through history itself.

Under such conditions, history ceases to function as scholarly inquiry and becomes an instrument of geopolitical psychology. The past is no longer examined critically; it is appropriated symbolically. The consequence is the emergence of narratives portraying neighboring peoples and territories not as sovereign historical entities, but as incomplete extensions of a supposedly greater civilizational continuum. This phenomenon has repeatedly appeared in Balkan political discourse.

Within this broader framework, recent remarks by Aleksander Dugin deserve careful attention. Widely perceived as one of the principal intellectual exponents of Russian neo-Eurasianism and an influential interpreter of contemporary Kremlin geopolitical thinking, Dugin recently asserted that “modern Albania was created by the Orthodox priest Fan Noli.” The statement emerged unexpectedly, particularly given Albania’s classification by the Russian Foreign Ministry among states considered politically hostile to Russian interests.

At first glance, the declaration may appear complimentary toward Fan Noli. Yet its strategic subtext is considerably more complex. Such formulations rarely constitute neutral historical observations. Rather, they attempt to redefine the genealogy of national legitimacy by isolating one component of a multifaceted historical process. In doing so, they subtly seek to reposition Albania’s state formation within a broader Orthodox geopolitical narrative.

A rigorous examination of Albanian state formation demonstrates, however, that modern Albania emerged through the indispensable contribution of three principal elite structures. The first consisted of the Catholic intellectual and religious elite of northern Albania, operating largely under the diplomatic and cultural protection of Vienna. The second included eminent representatives of the Albanian Orthodox population, among whom Fan S. Noli occupied a uniquely distinguished position. The third pillar comprised the Albanian-Ottoman administrative and diplomatic elite, many of whom had attained significant positions within the imperial structures of the Ottoman state. The Albanian national project was therefore not the product of a singular ideological current, but the synthesis of several political, religious, and cultural traditions.

To reduce this complexity to an exclusively Orthodox genesis is to misinterpret both the sociology and diplomacy of Albanian nation-building. Such reductionism overlooks the delicate equilibrium through which Albania succeeded in constructing a viable state despite immense regional pressures and competing imperial interests.

Fan Noli himself understood this dilemma with exceptional clarity. One prominent American historian of modern Albanian and Balkan history (Prof. Bernd Fischer) once described Noli as “a giant of Albanian and international cultural history.” This characterization was not exaggerated. Noli’s importance did not derive solely from his literary, theological, or political accomplishments, but from his strategic understanding of institutional sovereignty.

The establishment of the Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church represented, above all, a project of state consolidation. Noli perceived that a newly created Albanian state could not achieve durable stability while significant portions of its Orthodox population remained structurally dependent upon ecclesiastical institutions influenced by foreign geopolitical centers, particularly Greece, Serbia, or Russia. His objective was therefore neither theological isolation nor narrow religious nationalism. Rather, it was the creation of an ecclesiastical framework compatible with Albanian political sovereignty and national cohesion.

Archival research conducted in Vienna further reinforces this interpretation. Documents preserved within Austrian diplomatic archives reveal that the idea of supporting an Albanian Orthodox autocephaly had also been encouraged by sophisticated diplomats within the Ballhausplatz, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry. Among them was August Kral, the Habsburg consul in Albania and one of the most knowledgeable Austro-Hungarian experts on Albanian affairs. Following the First World War, Kral later directed Austria’s diplomatic representation in the Turkey of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

Kral recommended support for an Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church according to principles strikingly similar to those advanced by Fan Noli himself. The rationale was fundamentally geopolitical. Vienna understood that the stabilization of Albania required autonomous national institutions capable of limiting external ideological penetration. Thus, the Albanian Orthodox Church was viewed not merely as a religious institution, but as an instrument of state resilience and strategic equilibrium in the Balkans.

It is within this historical and geopolitical perspective that Dugin’s recent intervention should be interpreted. Contemporary Russian geopolitical discourse frequently revisits historical narratives not simply to reinterpret the past, but to shape future strategic perceptions. Historical revisionism, when employed through selective formulations, seeks to reopen symbolic spaces of influence within regions historically contested between empires and civilizations.

For Albania, the significance of such narratives extends beyond academic debate. They resonate within a broader regional environment where segments of neighboring political and intellectual elites continue, at times, to perceive Albanian historical consolidation with hesitation or latent discomfort. Consequently, intellectual vigilance becomes indispensable. The response to ideological distortions cannot rely upon emotional reaction or rhetorical nationalism alone. It requires scholarly rigor, cultural confidence, and institutional seriousness.

In the contemporary era, this challenge acquires an additional dimension. Artificial intelligence, digital communication, and algorithmic dissemination now accelerate the circulation of historical narratives with unprecedented speed. Societies lacking intellectual preparation may become vulnerable to sophisticated forms of informational manipulation disguised as historical interpretation. Under such conditions, classical cultural formation, archival scholarship, and disciplined historical methodology become instruments not only of academic inquiry but of national strategic importance.

Ultimately, the durability of a state depends not solely upon military alliances or economic indicators, but upon the intellectual coherence through which it understands its own historical legitimacy. Albania’s modern identity emerged from coexistence rather than exclusivity, from equilibrium rather than ideological absolutism. Its historical experience demonstrates that national survival in the Balkans has often depended less upon domination than upon the capacity to preserve internal balance amid competing external pressures.

For this reason, the legacy of Fan Noli cannot be appropriated into any singular geopolitical narrative. He belongs not to an imperial vision, but to the history of Albanian political self-determination and sovereign continuity. Its intellectual and diplomatic legacy continues to shape Albania’s historical consciousness. / ADN

*Dritan Hoti completed a PhD in the history of international relations from the University of Vienna, an MA in Geopolitical Studies from the University of Toulouse, and a degree in International Relations from the University of Graz.