On May 18, German Chancellor Merz, in a letter to the three leaders of the European Union, proposed that the six Western Balkan states, including Albania, as well as Ukraine and Moldova, should not initially join the EU with full rights as Croatia did in 2013 — the last case of regular full membership.

Mr. Merz revived the well-known idea of phased accession — an approach we have written about often over the past three years — and also provided details. For the new members, he proposes membership with the right to attend and talk but without the right to vote in the three European institutions (the Commission with no-portfolio commissioners, the Council, and the Parliament), as well as the step-by-step adoption of the *acquis communautaire* (EU legislation), gradual access to the Common Market accompanied by increased funding from Brussels, periodic EU/new-member sessions, and corrective mechanisms if the new member backslides on fundamental European values. The Chancellor also stated that this partial membership would eventually transform into full membership.

Similarly, just a few days ago, five EU member states (Austria, Czechia, Italy, Slovakia, and Slovenia) in an internal note to the European Commission also suggested phased integration, for example in the Common Market, starting with energy, transport, and digital policies.

To claim, after so many signals over these three years — including the most recent ones — that Albania will negotiate and close all 35 chapters and then join the EU in the same way as the candidates who joined in the last three decades is to behave like an ostrich with its head in the sand. The Rama government’s claims that it will conclude negotiations in 2027 and, after the necessary member states ratifications, achieve membership in 2030 are not only unrealistic but absurd, if not laughable, to any external observer. To someone watching from inside the country, it is clear that this issue is used primarily for propaganda. The fact that the Enlargement Commissioner has hinted that the 2027/2030 deadlines are possible has helped neither a realistic perspective on membership nor the perception of the Commission as a serious body.

Last month we received the good news that the EU and Montenegro have established a working group for drafting the country’s accession treaty. This seems to stick to the “Croatian” membership model seemingly bypassing the phased accession. Time will tell whether Podgorica will achieve full membership and remain the exception that confirms the rule in the Western Balkans, or whether it too will end up with a half-baked membership like the other five.

For Albania, the above debate is important, but not the most important one. Our country was a constitutional republic between 2005 and 2013 — undoubtedly with imperfections, as is generally the case with democracies, but where it was possible to change power through elections. We received EU candidate status only in 2014. Today Albania finds itself under an authoritarian-kleptocratic regime, yet it has opened all negotiation chapters with the EU. History will view this as a great irony and a relativization of European values.

The greatest help the EU could provide would be in restoring basic constitutional values. For this, Brussels has a principle that has been neglected and even forgotten in the last 12 years: conditionality.

The latest episode with the IBAR — the suspension of its approval for five months and the tougher language, including on elections, in the latest Council text — shows that there is still hope that the negotiation process, beyond the technical and bureaucratic approach, can be essentially useful. And for this belated awakening of the European Union, we must say, with only a little bit of sarcasm: “Thank you, Rama & Balluku.”

*President of Paneuropa-Albania