Tradition of Political Upheavals in Russia Troubles Putin

Political systems seldom arise by accident. Their architecture reflects a society’s moral ethos, historical psychology, and collective memory. The endurance or collapse of a regime depends not only on constitutional forms but on the deeper interplay between power and political culture. Western systems, despite their flaws, evolved through centuries of negotiation between liberty and authority, producing institutions capable of peaceful power transitions. Even these, however, face crises of legitimacy, polarization, and exhaustion in an age dominated by artificial intelligence—an era demanding conceptual renewal and structural adaptation.

Russia’s political trajectory differs profoundly. From Tsarist autocracy to Bolshevik terror and Putin’s centralized rule, it has seldom known genuine democratic succession. Power has passed not through transparent elections but via intrigue, coercion, and elimination of rivals. The nature of Russian authority—fused with the state’s survival instinct—has created a tradition where stability is equated with concentration of power, and pluralism with weakness. This legacy continues to define the anxieties surrounding Vladimir Putin’s future.

Historically, Russia’s vast geography, repeated invasions, and social fragmentation generated a deep distrust of decentralization. Centralized rule was seen as the only defense against chaos. This pattern produced strong states but insecure leaders. Beneath apparent unity, rival networks and succession fears constantly eroded authority from within.

Under the Romanovs, legitimacy rested on sacred monarchy and autocratic grandeur, yet the empire was riddled with rivalry and bureaucratic factionalism. The Russo-Japanese defeat in 1905 shattered the myth of imperial invincibility and unleashed revolutionary forces. The pattern would repeat: external military failure precipitating internal upheaval. The First World War completed this cycle. Catastrophic losses to Germany destroyed the foundation of monarchy, collapsing Imperial Russia and enabling the Bolshevik Revolution. Once coercive legitimacy dissolved, state disintegration followed with astonishing speed.

The Bolsheviks merely reinvented despotism. Succession under Lenin’s heirs took the form of purges and factional annihilation. Stalin, convinced that survival required absolute control, eradicated potential rivals—Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky—through intrigue, terror, and administrative precision. Fear became institutionalized as the essence of Soviet governance. After Stalin, power remained a function of elite maneuvering, not legality: Khrushchev’s triumph over Beria and his own later ousting by Brezhnev’s coalition displayed the continuity of opaque factional control. The Soviet system could preserve stability but not legitimate rotation of leadership.

From this inheritance arose Vladimir Putin. A product of the security apparatus, he was elevated by the post-Soviet elite seeking order after the anarchy of the 1990s. His tenure restored the central power of the state, subordinated oligarchs, weakened regional autonomy, and re-empowered the coercive institutions. For Russians weary of humiliation, Putin’s rule offered stability and renewed national pride. Yet the system remained personal, not institutional. Its persistence is bound to his authority—making succession itself the seed of potential instability.

Putin’s ascent, like many turning points in Russian history, was born of military failure. The disarray of the First Chechen War discredited Yeltsin and created demand for a leader capable of restoring control. Once again, war intertwined with domestic transformation. Today, amid the conflict in Ukraine, the same structural logic re-emerges.

Military setbacks and withdrawals from occupied territories have eroded the perception of invincibility that sustained Putin’s image. Although the Kremlin maintains dominance over narrative and institutions, prolonged warfare breeds exhaustion and silent division—both among elites and within society. The Wagner rebellion, led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, exposed fissures inside the power machinery. For the first time in decades, Russia’s “vertical of power” appeared vulnerable. In systems whose stability depends on the illusion of strength, even brief displays of weakness can have enduring consequences.

Ukrainian intelligence operations and drone strike deep inside Russian territory have further challenged the aura of control surrounding the Kremlin. Their symbolic value outweighs their material impact: they puncture the perception that the Russian state commands its sovereign space entirely. The resulting insecurity reaches beyond strategy, into the existential realm of politics itself.

In Russian tradition, wars rarely remain external affairs. Defeat or stalemate corrodes elite cohesion and accelerates rivalries within the state. What appears monolithic can unravel suddenly once the perception of effective leadership wanes. The durability of personal regimes often ends not with gradual decline but with abrupt rupture. Each era—imperial, Soviet, post-Soviet—has demonstrated how external crisis and domestic fragility intertwine.

Thus, the outcome of the Ukrainian war may shape not only the country’s geopolitical future but Putin’s political survival. His authority has always rested on the promise of restored greatness. Military adversity undermines that myth and transforms succession from a distant issue into an imminent danger.

Recent indications suggest growing isolation. The conspicuous absence of senior Chinese representation at Russia’s May 9 celebrations signaled diplomatic caution. Reports of heightened Kremlin security and possible retreat to fortified facilities, whether factual or symbolic, reveal a leadership besieged by anxiety. In a system where image and perception define legitimacy, even rumor becomes politically consequential.

Russian history teaches a cruel rhythm: authority seems strongest just before collapse. The Tsarist façade crumbled after a war lost abroad; the Soviet regime disintegrated after Afghanistan and economic decline. Putin’s Russia may follow the same historical logic. Concentrated power, which once promised invulnerability, becomes paralysis when the leader’s aura weakens.

The Kremlin grasps this better than anyone. Hence Putin’s deepest fear may not lie on foreign battlefields but in the long shadow of Russia’s own political past—a past where wars abroad have so often ignited revolutions at home. /ADN

*Dritan Hoti completed a PhD in the history of international relations from the University of Vienna, an MA in Geopolitical Studies from the University of Toulouse, and a degree in International Relations from the University of Graz.