Recently, the position of the incoming German government coalition between the CDU/CSU and SPD parties regarding the enlargement of the European Union to the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine sparked a vivid debate in Albania. The coalition conditioned the accession of candidate states on a change in the decision-making process for enlargement within the European Council (the member states), moving from unanimity (as it currently stands) to qualified majority voting. This clause was presented as a new development that invalidates Prime Minister Rama's electoral promise to conclude negotiations within two years and achieve EU membership by 2030. But is this condition really new, and does it actually block Albania and other candidates from joining?

Is this a new condition?

The condition of “enlargement after reform” is not a new element introduced by the German Christian Democrats of Friedrich Merz. The outgoing government of the Social Democrat Chancellor Scholz (2021–2025) also clearly stated in its program that institutional reform was a necessary prerequisite for the EU to function with more members. Mr. Scholz clearly illustrated this stance in his “Europe speech” in Prague in August 2022. The only new aspect from Germany is that this position is now jointly held by both major German parties, without which no government can be formed (AfD, the other major party currently in the top three, is against EU enlargement in principle). So at least for the next decade, Germany's position is clear.

But this condition isn’t only held by Germany—it is shared by France as well. At the EU–Western Balkans Summit held in Sofia in May 2018, pro-enlargement participants hoped for significant progress. But French President Macron quashed that optimism by making it clear that even with 27 members, the EU was functioning poorly and could not afford to add another half-dozen seats to the European Council, thereby paralyzing decision-making with endless objections and vetoes.

This stance of Germany and France is likely also shared by other countries like the Netherlands and Denmark.

Are there chances that this condition will be met?

To eliminate unanimity, a unanimous vote is required: but can all member states agree to relinquish such a meaningful instrument as the veto? In the past decade, vetoes have been used to block decisions related to Russia and Ukraine (Hungary, Slovakia), China (Greece), Turkey/Belarus (Cyprus), and Schengen (Austria, the Netherlands). The veto is a guarantee for a member state that the EU will be forced to consider its national interests—interests that might otherwise be ignored. With rising security risks, the entire eastern flank of the EU, from Finland to Cyprus, is absolutely against losing the veto in matters of enlargement and foreign policy. So, according to EU pundits, the chances of fulfilling the Franco-German condition are nearly zero.

Why is the European Commission enthusiastic about enlargements?

At the aforementioned 2018 Sofia summit, European Commission officials considered Serbia and Montenegro as the “front-runner” candidates; they predicted both could join the EU by 2025—seven years later.

In 2018, Montenegro hadn’t experienced a democratic change of power in three decades; Serbia under Vucic had shown clear signs it was on the path to become an authoritarian and kleptocratic regime (not to mention its geopolitical alignment issues). Yet, these obvious facts did not diminish the optimism of Brussels officials. Now, in 2025—the year that had been forecast for their membership—these same officials offer Montenegro a new target year of 2030 for possible accession, and 2027 for concluding negotiations. This, despite the fact that Montenegro has been negotiating for 12 years, has opened 33 out of 35 chapters, and has concluded only three (the easiest ones). At this rate, the negotiations would end in 130 years. How Montenegro could qualitatively complete 32 remaining chapters qualitatively in just two years remains unexplained.

Albania's case is also interesting: starting in 2016, the European Commission proposed opening negotiations with Albania four times, and each time the Council did not approve. At the initiative of Germany, France, and the Netherlands in March 2020, the European Council set the well-known 15 conditions. Their argument was that negotiations could not be opened with a candidate state that lacked a functioning Supreme Court and Constitutional Court.

Currently, EU enlargement officials claim that Albania can negotiate and conclude all 33 chapters by 2027—at the same time as Montenegro—even though Albania only began substantive work on the chapters in October 2024 (out of 16 chapters opened so far, nine were just opened a few days ago; 17 more are expected to open in the future).

The unrealistic optimism of the Commission officials regarding enlargement is quite interesting. They see it as their mission and often they need to balance other EU forces that are a priori against new memberships; this for sure a positive thing. But underestimating or misjudging fundamental issues such as democracy and the rule of law, a technical focus on legislation on paper with less on real-life law implementation and the need to show a “success story” push them toward mistakes with real consequences. Additionally, today’s geopolitical turmoil drives them to seek “stability” by supporting stabilocrats who are, as a rule, anti-democratic kleptocrats.

Thus, during her visit to Belgrade in October 2024, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen surprised the public with her praise for Serbia’s “European achievements” under president Vucic. Only after a student protest shook the country did von der Leyen mention to the Serbian president in Brussels in March of this year that there were problems “with elections, media freedom, and corruption.” Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, however, has not made such a shift. During her first official visit to Tirana a month ago, she inappropriately used the occasion in favor of Edi Rama’s electoral campaign—even though, as a Slovenian, she should have known better than most that in the Balkans, a prime minister holding a third or, worse, a fourth consecutive term will only consolidate his authoritarian and kleptocratic regime.

For lack of a better option

The accession of candidate states, viewed through the lens of their failure to meet standards and the Franco-German condition, resembles Zeno’s Arrow Paradox. The ancient Greek philosopher of the 5th century BC claimed that an arrow in flight toward a target always covers half the remaining distance and therefore never reaches it. Nevertheless, the EU’s concrete offer of “staged accession” is a very useful and beneficial alternative until better times come for full membership. It envisions that candidate states, after meeting specific conditions, gain full access to programs and structures that until recently were reserved only for EU member states.

One example is membership in the Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA). This means that bank transfers with the Eurozone would occur instantly and at zero cost. That would be a significant improvement over today, when Albanian citizens and businesses pay up to EUR 100 in extra fees for banks transfer into the Eurozone. Central banks in Tirana and Podgorica have been working on this for months, and SEPA is expected to be activated within the year.

Another area of interest would be allowing candidate states to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), which handles fraud involving EU funds. In that case, the corruption file involving the EU IPARD funds would not be archived by sleepy prosecutors in Tirana but would more likely lead to criminal charges at the government level.

Beyond that, one could also envisage access to financial programs, the Single Market, and EU institutions linked to strict conditionality.

Steps like these would integrate Albania into the EU more effectively than illusionist reports, bombastic summits and empty promises.

Former minister and DP MP*