The movement of American military assets toward the Middle East in recent weeks served as a warning signal for what we are witnessing today. The United States and Israel are carrying out in Iran one of the most complex military interventions in recent years, which—unlike previous ones—appears likely to last longer. What is unfolding is not the beginning of a world war, nor an isolated episode among the many conflicts that have shaped the Middle East. Rather, it represents, so far, the most significant moment in a long game that is reshaping the global order.

To explain Iran’s role, we must understand its key position as a strategic node, not merely as a regional power with nuclear ambitions. Iran is part of the “geography of energy,” given its influence over the Strait of Hormuz. Control of Hormuz directly affects the supply of oil and energy to the industrial economies of Asia and Europe. Iran’s malign network across several Middle Eastern states—although weakened in recent years—continues to operate against the projection of American power. Both Russia and China have an interest in Iran’s survival, as a capitulated Iran would reorganize the geopolitical landscape in favor of the United States, with implications stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean through the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean.

Controlled Economic Chaos

The duration of the war reflects its complexity. The initial balance is clear. Iran’s key political and military leadership has been killed, including the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has been replaced by his son. Air defense systems, naval capabilities, and ballistic missile capacities have been severely damaged. Although Iran is weaker in the face of combined American-Israeli power, it reacted immediately by striking primarily civilian targets—oil and gas facilities, technological infrastructure, and U.S. diplomatic missions in neighboring countries, none of which are belligerent parties—in an attempt to pressure them to influence Washington to halt the war.

Tehran activated its most visible lever of power: controlled economic chaos. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on energy infrastructure across the region have already caused a major rupture in the global oil market. The inability to export crude oil threatens permanent damage to oil wells. Restoring supply after such disruptions is a lengthy process, leaving the global economy in a state of uncertainty. At the same time, the gas market is in turmoil, as the Qatari refinery that produces one-fifth of global supply is currently not operating.

Iran is playing the time factor, aware that prolonged wars rarely enjoy sustained public support in the United States. Its objective is to absorb the shockwaves, survive the pressure, and demonstrate resilience. At the same time, it seeks to inflict as much damage as possible on the critical infrastructure of neighboring countries linked to technology, energy, tourism, and finance. Meanwhile, the cost of the war is borne by Iran’s population, which remains largely defenseless in the face of the attacks.

A Front with Unequal Objectives

While survival remains the overriding priority for the regime in Tehran, the United States initially declared that it had launched the military intervention with the goal of regime change. President Trump called on Iranians to rise up against the mullahs. Apparently, hopes were pinned on a scenario similar to that of Venezuela, where the aim was to identify an individual or group from within the corridors of power willing to cooperate with the United States.

For the moment, this appears difficult. Unlike the regime in Caracas, the one in Tehran is not a personalist regime but a system structured along several dimensions, including the theocratic order and the repressive security apparatus. Iran’s ethnic composition is complex. Moreover, for decades the regime has managed to survive the sanctions imposed by the West.

It appears that President Trump chose to act now not because Iran posed a direct threat to the United States, nor because of its nuclear capacity—which he had declared destroyed during the brief air campaign of June last year—but on the assumption that years of economic mismanagement, sanctions, the bloody suppression of popular protests in January, and military degradation had left Iran weaker than ever. Although we are already in the second week of the war, the regime in Iran is still standing and has shown no signs of capitulation.

The Iranian regime was widely considered weakened after two blows it suffered from the United States last year. Yet history shows that regime change is a far more difficult process, as it requires ground forces, democratic assistance to build institutions, and an organized opposition ready to take power. The United States has ruled out deploying ground forces, while Iran lacks a cohesive organized opposition. The protesters who took to the streets in January—whom the regime massacred in the tens of thousands—remain unarmed and unorganized. They face an internal security apparatus that continues to be repressive and largely untouched by the war. In short, Iran’s capacity and willingness to suppress its own population exceed its ability to sustain its role as a regional power.

Although this is a joint American-Israeli military intervention, it must be said that their objectives are not identical. For Israel, the goal is not merely weakening nuclear capabilities, ensuring stability, or promoting democratic change, but Iran’s capitulation. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not concealed Israel’s intention to destroy the pillars of the regime and “settle accounts” with Iran once and for all, as the culmination of a forty-year confrontation.

The Balance of Hostilities

The mutual hostilities among Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have, in a sense, served to keep the geopolitical tectonic plates of the Middle East in balance. In recent years, however, this balance has shifted in Israel’s favor. Iran’s position has weakened as a result of Western sanctions. Its main ally and Israel’s adversary, Bashar al-Assad, is no longer Syria’s leader. The power of Hamas and Hezbollah has been significantly weakened by successive conflicts, while the Houthis in Yemen have so far not entered the confrontation.

The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council tacitly approved the American-Israeli intervention, given Iran’s malign activities as well as its capacity to launch short-range missiles and drones. Iran’s attack on the United Arab Emirates prompted the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to restore direct relations after a long period of tensions. The Saudis even offered what they described as brotherly support for the defense of the Emirates.

The Gulf countries, however, do not view favorably the strengthening and dominance of Israel in the Middle East. Despite their differences, the United States and Europe share an interest in the uninterrupted flow of oil, goods, and capital, as well as in restoring a degree of balance in the Middle East. Because of its geographic proximity, Europe in particular fears the humanitarian consequences of the conflict.

Russia finds itself in a stronger position than before the start of this war. International attention and military presence have shifted from Ukraine to the Middle East. Russia’s budget is in a better condition thanks to higher oil and gas prices. At the same time, Moscow is expanding its influence among countries in need of energy supplies. In the longer term, China is projecting the possibility of intervention in Taiwan. For the moment, it remains the only major power engaging with the parties in the Middle East through a special envoy, signaling its preference for stability and constructive relations with all sides.

Exit Strategy

Can this military intervention overthrow a contemptible and threatening regime in the Middle East and replace it with something better? Is there an exit strategy from this war, especially when the initial reactions to the intervention presented a wide range of justifications—from weakening nuclear capabilities and Iran’s diplomatic intransigence, to the failure of negotiations, the belief that Israeli strikes against Iran were imminent, and even the prospect of regime change?

Although the arguments for regime change may appear compelling, past precedents do not support the likelihood of achieving the desired outcome. Since the 1950s, the United States has unsuccessfully attempted—at great human and financial cost—to reshape the political landscape of the Middle East. Perhaps this is also one of the reasons why, in the National Security Strategy published last November, the United States adopted a more pragmatic approach toward regimes in the Middle East, acknowledging the historical and social traditions of their societies.

Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, as more recent examples, frequently reappear in public debate whenever regime change or the impact of foreign policy on domestic affairs is discussed. Despite expectations of exporting democracy, stability, and prosperity, the conflict in Iraq lasted nearly a decade and resulted in the loss of thousands of lives on all sides.

In Afghanistan, the conflict lasted around two decades, with a large number of casualties, and ended bitterly with the return of the Taliban to power. Even without ground forces, regime-change operations carry significant costs and risks. In Libya, where the United States and its Western allies relied on air power, several months of bombardment were required before Muammar Gaddafi was killed. After that, Libya descended into civil war and violence that spread—along with refugees and weapons—to neighboring countries such as Chad and Mali.

In Syria, efforts to topple the regime of Bashar al-Assad without ground forces proved even more exhausting. Arming his opponents did not lead to his downfall but instead escalated the conflict, prompting intervention by Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia, and resulting in a brutal civil war, humanitarian catastrophe, and refugee flows mainly toward Europe. Assad was forced to leave power more than a decade later.

The reasons why it is far more difficult to build a state and install a better government than to destroy a state or remove a bad government are no mystery. The removal of a brutal regime creates a political and security vacuum that is difficult to fill. Viewed in this context, the prospects for regime change leading to a democratic Iran appear limited. However, continued military pressure and strikes against the critical infrastructure sustaining the regime could eventually produce a less radical leadership in the future.

Time will show how feasible that outcome may be. We are at the most unpredictable moment in the Middle East since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. As Henry Kissinger rightly argued regarding the “interconnectedness of conflicts,” the way this war ends will have consequences not only for the issues that ignited it—such as nuclear capabilities, ballistic missiles, or the sanctions regime against Iran. This war marks the culmination of a long geopolitical game reshaping the global order, which increasingly appears likely to be based more on power than on rules.

Ditmir Bushati, former Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, former deputy in the Parliament of Albania.

**The opinions published on IBNA are solely those of the authors.