“Unfortunately, I predict that Russian aggression will continue. I don’t reckon that Russia, despite the large expenditure of resources and suffering huge losses, will achieve any serious success at the front,” has said political analyst and Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw, Marciej Ras.  

In an exclusive interview with Albanian Daily News on the eve of the first anniversary of the Russian aggression against Ukraine on February 24 the Professor dwelt on the situation in this country where the hostilities are taking place on its territory, Ukrainian civilians are dying, and Ukrainian homes, workplaces, farmlands, etc. are being destroyed.  “Assuming that the current determination of the Ukrainians and the support of the West for Ukraine (which will probably even increase) are maintained, the war will cost Russia more and more, with constantly limited possibilities of its financing, especially due to sanctions and dwindling financial and material reserves.”

The Professor stressed that almost the entire political elite, including all significant political groupings: both the government coalition and the opposition, and the vast majority of Polish society support Ukraine in its war with Russia. According to him, this is determined by the specific identification of Poland's national interest, which is fear of further expansion by the Kremlin. “Russia is perceived as the main source of external threats to Poland as well as the EU and NATO as a whole and the baggage of historical experience in relations with Russia and the USSR.”   

The Warsaw University Professor noted that Poland and Poles feel support from their allies, and according to him, the attitude of the United States is decisive regarding this.

The US President, Joe Biden will pay an official visit to Warsaw on February 21-22 this year, and it is the first time that a US president visits Poland twice in the space of a year. Biden visited Poland last March, a month after the start of the war. Such an event takes special importance because it happens against the background of the incessantly Russian aggression on Ukraine and other developments in Europe and the world.

“Two visits by President Biden and one by Vice-President Harris in less than a year, numerous visits by other officials, unequivocal political declarations, and, above all, the presence of the US armed forces in Poland affect the sense of security among Poles. Similarly, political, economic and, to some extent, also military support, for example, German or British, from other allies and the EU and NATO as institutions play an important role," said the Professor.

Touching upon the Polish-Belarusian relations, Mr. Ras said they have deteriorated significantly recently and in fact they broke down. In his view there are threats of spillover of the Russian aggression in the region, however, smaller than a year ago. “Belarus may be dragged into an open war with Ukraine by Russia, although this is unlikely, because Lukashenka himself wants to avoid it at all costs. If the economic crisis deepens and the regime collapses, we can expect Russian intervention in Belarus,” he revealed.

Asked about how official Warsaw considered the stance of some EU member countries, also NATO members which show open reluctance to the sanctions against Russia, Mr.Ras said Poland has used all measures to build and enhance the West’s cohesion since the outbreak of war. He highlighted the case of Hungary which can be treated as exceptional as Orban’s de facto pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian policy is difficult to understand for Poles and it is disappointing considering the "traditional" Polish-Hungarian friendship as well as Hungary's experience with Russia and the USSR. “However, Hungary is too weak to influence the EU or NATO positions on Ukraine and Russia. Albeit, Orban's position is destroying V-4 group unity to a greater extent.”

In the meantime the Polish Professor was sure that the EU institutions look at the Balkans challenges differently than previously considering Russia’s engagement and it gives more opportunities for the strengthening of the EU integration process in the case of non-EU Western Balkans partners. “However, the speed of this process will depend primarily on the efforts of the countries concerned. In the current situation, the Western Balkan countries can expect more interest from the EU and leading European powers. I hope that growing interest will be transformed into more resources transferred to support those efforts,” said political analyst and Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw, Marciej Ras in the following interview:    

Albanian Daily News: Russian aggression continues against Ukraine in its second year of the occupation war. The Ukrainian people are putting up a brave resistance having the support of democratic countries among which Poland has a leading role. How do you see the way that things are developing and what will 2023 bring about regarding this war in the European continent, the first since the end of the Second World War?

Professor at Warsaw University Marciej Ras:  Unfortunately, I predict that Russian aggression will continue. I don’t reckon that Russia, despite the large expenditure of resources and suffering huge losses, will achieve any serious success at the front. Assuming that the current determination of the Ukrainians and the support of the West for Ukraine (which will probably even increase) are maintained, the war will cost Russia more and more, with constantly limited possibilities of its financing, especially due to sanctions and dwindling financial and material reserves.

The West, led by the US, shows unity and strong support for Ukraine and seeks to weaken Russia in order to limit its ability to conduct further aggressive actions (minimum political goal).

Moreover, Ukraine may regain the strategic initiative again (as in the case of recapturing Kherson and parts of the occupied territories in eastern Ukraine last year), although a complete expulsion of Russian forces from Ukraine within the pre-2014 borders shouldn’t be expected.

Let us not forget, however, that hostilities are taking place on Ukrainian territory, Ukrainian civilians are dying, and Ukrainian homes, workplaces, farmlands, etc. are being destroyed. The Kremlin hopes that the Ukrainians will be "tired" by the hardships of the war, which would result in political disintegration on the Ukrainian side and a tendency to make concessions, even territorial ones, to Russia. However, I think that this time Russia will miscalculate in this respect once again. The Ukrainians will not give up, despite their suffering. Kiev is aware that any concessions and "freezing" of the conflict will only temporarily delay the next stage of aggression from Russia.

On the other hand, the Kremlin elites are unable to end this war with their own success (lack of adequate forces) or agree to return to the status quo ante bellum (which would be tantamount to their discredit). The end of hostilities would also mean the need to return to "normal life" in Russia, including focusing on overcoming the economic crisis and partial international isolation. The situation of living in a "besieged fortress" created by the Kremlin makes it much easier to control the society in crisis conditions.

Considering the above, a continuation of the attrition warfare is to be expected.

- There is no doubt that the Russian aggression against Ukraine has its impact on Poland regarding the economy. Two questions: how have the people reacted to such a thing and secondly is Poland being supported by the EU, the NATO allies as it is keeping the heaviest burden of the repercussions of the war?

- Almost the entire political elite (including all significant political groupings: both the government coalition and the opposition) and the vast majority of Polish society support Ukraine in its war with Russia. This is determined by the specific identification of Poland's national interest (fear of further expansion by the Kremlin; Russia is perceived as the main source of external threats to Poland as well as the EU and NATO as a whole) and the baggage of historical experience in relations with Russia and the USSR. Ordinary human feelings are also important: to statements such as "this is not our war", Poles usually reply "can you be neutral to rape?" At this point, it is worth recalling the spontaneous activities of civil society in Poland for refugees from Ukraine.

Poland and Poles feel support from our allies. The attitude of the US is decisive here. Two visits by President Biden and one by Vice-President Harris in less than a year, numerous visits by other officials, unequivocal political declarations, and, above all, the presence of the US armed forces in Poland affect the sense of security among Poles. Similarly, political, economic and, to some extent, also military support (for example, German or British) from other allies and the EU and NATO as institutions play an important role. Paradoxically, at present the sense of security may be even greater than before the war, when the cohesion of the West and the allies' loyalty were sometimes questioned. Not without significance is also the change in the position of the EU's Western European partners (led by Germany and France) to the Kremlin's policy, especially the rapid increase in understanding for the interests of the EU and NATO "eastern flank" countries.

- In the meantime, how do you assess the relations between Poland and Belarus? Are there threats of spillover of the Russian aggression in the region?

- The Polish-Belarusian relations have deteriorated significantly recently. In fact, they broke down. The brutal suppression of the democratic movement in Belarus, the rapid intensification of anti-Western and anti-Polish rhetoric by official Minsk, severe harassment of representatives of the Polish minority in Belarus, and finally, participation in Russia's aggression against Ukraine. These facts have resulted in a virtual freeze of political dialogue. However, it hasn’t changed positive people-to-people relations (majority of Belarusians do not support the Lukashenka’s regime).

There are threats of spillover of Russian aggression in the region. However, smaller than a year ago. Belarus may be dragged into an open war with Ukraine by Russia, although this is unlikely, because Lukashenka himself wants to avoid it at all costs. If the economic crisis deepens and the regime collapses, we can expect Russian intervention in Belarus.

- As a follow, Professor Ras, how does official Warsaw consider the stance of some EU member countries, also NATO members, which show open reluctance to the sanctions against Russia? Moreover, like in some cases, there are key political leaders who hold the Ukrainian President responsible for the prolongation of the war?

- Poland has used all measures (see the activity of the president, the government, the parliament, Polish MEPs, numerous sub-national authorities, NGO’s and personalities) to build and enhance the West’s cohesion since the outbreak of war. Poland, including not only the government but also opposition parties, have tried to influence our partners to become more decisive. We haven’t been alone in those efforts: the same or very similar position has been presented, inter alia, by the UK, Nordic countries, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and some other allied countries.  The case of Hungary can be treated as exceptional: Orban’s de facto pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian policy is difficult to understand for Poles and disappointing considering the "traditional" Polish-Hungarian friendship as well as Hungary's experience with Russia and the USSR. It’s also problematic for the Polish right-wing government that has tried to cooperate with Hungarian political and ideological partners within the EU institutions.  However, Hungary is too weak to influence the EU or NATO positions on Ukraine and Russia. Albeit, Orban's position is destroying V-4 group unity to a greater extent.

- Let me touch upon the Western Balkans, a region which has the great attention of Poland as well as of the Visegrad Group, which supports the speeding up of the EU integration process of the regional countries, including Albania. Do you think that Brussels should view the situation differently especially in view of the Russian aggressive policy and its unchanged ambitions to strengthen its influence in the region having Serbia as its main stronghold?

-I’m sure that the EU institutions look at the Balkans challenges differently than previously considering Russia’s engagement as well as policy of other third countries, especially China. It gives more opportunities for the strengthening of the EU integration process in the case of non-EU Western Balkans partners. However, the speed of this process will depend primarily on the efforts of the countries concerned. In the current situation, the Western Balkan countries can expect more interest from the EU and leading European powers. I hope that growing interest will be transformed into more resources transferred to support those efforts.