1.

I met an old American diplomat friend, a long-time supporter of Biden, who told me that President Trump is doing more for the Western Balkans than President Biden, citing as an example the ultimatum the U.S. administration has issued to Serbia regarding Russian ownership in the oil industry (NIS)—an ultimatum demanding a break from Russian energy dependence. If Serbia were to take this step, Russia would lose one of its key pillars of influence in the country, which in turn was expected to lead Serbia away from other Russian points of influence in security and foreign policy.

It is a paradox, he admitted, that a supporter of President Biden (and a member of his presidential-elect foreign policy team) would state that a strategic move by the Trump administration could outweigh more than four years of political struggle in Belgrade and push it toward the West.

A few days later, NSS 2025—the new U.S. National Security Strategy—was published, the document representing the most dramatic turn in American foreign policy this century and arguably since the fall of the Berlin Wall. In it, my friend’s paradoxical remark took on a broader form regarding Serbia–Kosovo relations, because it declared that President Trump had negotiated peace between the two countries this year.

Although neither country’s leaders have acknowledged such a thing, and multiple interpretations are possible, let us accept for a moment the paradox of a negotiated peace unknown to the leaders involved. The assertion that the American president has achieved peace between Kosovo and Serbia implies additional responsibility for all three parties—Kosovo, Serbia, and the United States—in maintaining that peace, as well as the responsibility of either Kosovo or Serbia for any actions that might disrupt it.

Thus, the NSS becomes a determinant of new realities.

2.

The White House document represents the most radical shift in American foreign policy since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and in my assessment this stems from two essential factors. The first is an accurate reading of the historical moment. The NSS proclaims the end of the era in which the United States stood as the world’s sole global power, acknowledges a flawed American strategic assumption (“that by opening our markets to China, encouraging American businesses to invest there, and transferring our production, we would facilitate China’s entry into the so-called rules-based international order. This did not happen. China became richer and stronger, and used its wealth and power to its considerable advantage”), identifies the need for “strategic stability with Russia,” and envisions a redefined Middle East as a central point of coordination for U.S. policies in security, nuclear energy, artificial intelligence, and more.

The second factor—and here lies another paradox—is an ideological interpretation of the historical moment. Within this strategic reset, the NSS views Europe, America’s natural ally, through the lens of the MAGA worldview.

“Continental Europe has lost a share of global GDP—from 25 percent in 1990 to 14 percent today—partly due to national and transnational regulations that stifle creativity and hard work.

But this economic decline is overshadowed by the real and darker prospect of the erosion of civilization.

The major issues facing Europe include the actions of the European Union and other transnational bodies that undermine political freedom and sovereignty, migration policies that are transforming the continent and generating conflict, censorship of free speech and the suppression of political opposition, declining birth rates, and the loss of national identity and self-confidence.”

3.

This part of the document immediately sparked reactions among politicians and intellectuals across Europe, who have not yet forgotten Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, where he openly supported Europe’s far-right groups. When the NSS states that “we want to support our allies in preserving Europe’s freedom and security while restoring Europe’s civilized self-confidence and Western identity,” it is interpreted throughout Europe as a blueprint for attempting to replicate the American president’s political agenda on European soil—something that is already in motion among Prime Minister Orbán and his MEGA (Make Europe Great Again) allies.

This is a double paradox within the NSS, because it sets out two essential principles of a new world order. First, it revives the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine, by which the entire hemisphere from Alaska to Argentina becomes an American sphere of interest where no external power may intervene. The paradox is that the original doctrine relied on a tacit agreement: America would prevent interference in its hemisphere in exchange for staying out of European wars. This time, the U.S. demands that no one interfere in its hemisphere while simultaneously asserting the right to determine what Europe should look like.

Second, the NSS insists that international relations must be shaped by interactions between sovereign states—yet it simultaneously undermines the sovereignty of European states by defining their values and identity for them. With rhetoric reminiscent of the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, the NSS treats Europe’s own values as symptoms of civilizational decline.

4.

Yet some European reactions, focused largely on the offensive nature of terms such as “the real and bleak prospect of the erasure of civilization,” risk resembling the spectator of a magician who watches the wrong hand—the hand that draws attention but does not perform the trick.

The NSS outlines a strategic reconfiguration that begins with an all-out confrontation with China and continues along a natural geopolitical trajectory across the globe. In this vector-based reordering, Europe is neither an initiator nor an obstacle; over the past four years, and indeed since 2014, Europe has failed to halt Russian aggression against Ukraine. If the United States assumes this responsibility and fulfills it, the result will be “strategic stability with Russia,” a rebalancing of political, military, and economic relations that will directly affect Europe. Europe—within the new U.S. approach toward China, Russia, and the Middle East—assumes the role of a recipient of consequences, not an actor shaping them.

Moreover, this historic American pivot—perhaps stripped of ideological excess but retaining its strategic vectors—will likely define U.S. foreign policy for future presidents, regardless of party.

For Europe, the issue of J.D. Vance’s flirtation with far-right European movements may end up being secondary and temporary. What will remain is the possibility of a tectonically altered global order in which Europe plays a secondary role. / Koha